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A Common Platform for 
Securing the Benefits of  
Free Trade
This edition of the EFTA Bulletin – a yearly publication 
dedicated to one of EFTA’s fields of activity – explores 
EFTA’s free trade relations with partners outside the 
European Union.
The prosperity of the EFTA economies is highly 
dependent on access to foreign markets. At the same 
time, openness to incoming goods, services and 
investment constitutes a key factor for the EFTA 
States’ international competitiveness. The expansion 
of free trade relations with countries outside the 
European Union – or “third countries” in EFTA jargon 
– is therefore an important element on the economic 
agenda of the EFTA States. 
Recognising that better outcomes can be achieved by 
joining forces, the EFTA States have used EFTA as 
a platform for pursuing free trade agreements 
(FTAs). They coordinate positions and choose to speak 
with one voice at the negotiating table. This practical 
arrangement between like-minded countries has 
worked well and continues to deliver tangible results.
Today, EFTA has built one of the largest global 
trade networks extending well beyond the confines 
of Europe. This should not be taken as a sign of 
dissatisfaction with multilateral cooperation. On the 
contrary, EFTA free trade agreements build and expand 
FOREWORD
on the model of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
These agreements accommodate the need to deepen 
economic relations with interested partners prepared 
to pursue further liberalisation. 
The core objective of EFTA’s free trade policy is to 
improve the competitive position of its business 
operators and to avoid discrimination resulting from 
preferential agreements concluded by EFTA’s main 
competitors. To achieve these goals, EFTA has had to 
adapt to an evolving external economic environment 
and the challenges and opportunities that have been 
created by a rapidly globalising world. In fact, it has 
been remarkably successful at responding to new 
developments and emerging trade policy trends.
As EFTA free trade agreements “went global” from 
the second half of the 1990s and became detached 
from the original regional setting, EFTA led the way in 
concluding agreements with a diverse set of partners 
worldwide. The agreement with Singapore of 2002 – 
the first FTA between Europe and Asia – is a case in 
point. With the emergence of comprehensive FTAs, 
extending to areas such as services, investment and 
government procurement, EFTA has remained at the 
forefront by signing ambitious deals early on with 
interested partners such as Chile and Mexico. Recently, 
the FTAs with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro 
and the Central American States of Costa Rica and 
Panama have continued to broaden the scope of EFTA 
free trade agreements by introducing provisions on 
sustainable development.
The third-country file is likely to remain very active as 
EFTA continues to pursue the dual goals of broadening 
and deepening its free trade network in tandem with 
international developments. Traditional perspectives 
may be challenged as we reach out to an increasingly 
diverse set of potential new trading partners. In 
parallel, the upgrading of existing FTAs will prove 
essential for preserving a competitive position on 
third-country markets. In addition, the emerging 
“mega-regionals”, such as the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership between the European 
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EFTA’s free trade agreements. Following this overview, 
the Bulletin looks at insiders’ perspectives on free trade 
negotiations through interviews with chief negotiators. 
Next, we have invited representatives of the EFTA 
advisory bodies – the EFTA Parliamentary Committee 
and the EFTA Consultative Committee – to share their 
personal views on the broader context of EFTA’s free 
trade activities. The Bulletin closes with two articles 
by well known academics in the field, Patrick Low 
and Thomas Cottier. Their thought-provoking essays 
offer personal perspectives on the evolution of the 
general frameworks in which EFTA conducts its free 
trade policy – the WTO multilateral system and the 
European integration project. Contributions from eight 
companies complement this edition of the Bulletin by 
offering perspectives from the business world.
Kristinn F. Árnason 
Secretary-General
Union and the United States, are likely to create new 
dynamics and set new trade policy yardsticks which 
are bound to change certain parameters of our work.  
To be able to continue to adapt and deliver successful 
trade policy outcomes, EFTA will again rely on its 
traditional values of flexibility and pragmatism. 
As always, new trade agreements will be pursued 
wherever deemed politically and economically 
attractive and appropriate – whether in completing 
the European map, expanding links with the dynamic 
Asian region, building bridges to Africa’s growing 
economies or strengthening transatlantic links. EFTA 
is well placed to make the most of these opportunities.
This edition of the Bulletin brings together perspectives 
from trade practitioners, parliamentarians, social 
partners and academia. The opening contributions 
by the EFTA Chairperson, Minister Aurelia Frick of 
Liechtenstein, and EFTA Deputy Secretary-General, 
Ivo Kaufmann, examine the evolution and scope of 
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Development Agenda negotiations and persistent 
economic uncertainties. EFTA sees FTAs as a 
complement to the multilateral framework of the 
WTO, not as an alternative. Both the WTO system and 
preferential agreements are essential components of 
international economic governance. Their relevance 
has again been demonstrated recently when they were 
confirmed as important instruments for fending off 
protectionist pressures.
Since the early 1990s, EFTA has undertaken sustained 
efforts to enlarge its network of FTAs, both in and 
outside Europe, by embracing the opportunities and 
challenges arising from the end of the Cold War, 
economic globalisation and the rise of emerging 
economies. Today, this network is one of the largest in 
the world. Further negotiations and exploratory talks 
are ongoing with major emerging economies and a 
number of other prospective partners.
The criteria for entering into new negotiations are 
first and foremost based on economic considerations 
– an assessment of the current and potential economic 
importance of prospective partners, and of the potential 
for discrimination arising from other FTAs concluded 
by these countries. The other party’s willingness to 
enter into negotiations and the chances of successfully 
concluding such negotiations are also assessed.
One may wonder why these four rather small EFTA 
countries have been so successful at developing 
economic ties on a global scale. The reasons for this 
are manifold. First of all, by any measure, the EFTA 
countries are attractive trading partners. They have 
high per capita incomes and a sizable aggregate 
market. Together, the EFTA countries are the twelfth 
largest merchandise trader and sixth largest services 
trader (counting the European Union as one). In fact, 
EFTA’s merchandise trade figures are comparable with, 
or bigger than, several large emerging economies. The 
EFTA countries are also significant investors abroad, 
ranking third in global outward stocks of foreign 
THE ROLE OF EFTA’S 
THIRD-COUNTRY POLICY
Aurelia Frick 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Liechtenstein 
EFTA Chairperson
The EFTA countries are prosperous. Their economies, 
based on high value-added manufacturing and services, 
have recovered well from the recent global economic 
crises and are continuing to record some of the highest 
levels of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. 
Their companies are competitive, strongly export-
oriented and well connected to the global value chains.
The economies of the EFTA countries are open, and 
trade accounts for a significant part of their economic 
performance. Accordingly, the governments of 
the EFTA States attach great importance to further 
opening up world markets for goods and services. 
They consider non-discriminatory market access as 
a cornerstone for ensuring a favourable environment 
for their businesses and the best way to maintain the 
dynamism of their economies. While the European 
Union naturally remains EFTA’s leading partner, a 
considerable part of business and trade is conducted 
with other parts of the world.
The EFTA countries are staunch supporters of and 
active participants in the multilateral trading system. 
They have also continued to extend their network of 
free trade agreements, keeping track of the evolving 
landscape of world trade. This has been particularly 
relevant in an environment characterised by ongoing 
difficulties in the World Trade Organization’s Doha 
“The global 
economy has 
become the 
natural operating 
environment 
for many EFTA 
companies.”
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a position to achieve balanced outcomes in its FTAs, 
EFTA has to adjust its approach to trade negotiations 
continuously. This is particularly relevant in regard 
of developing countries, which tend to have different 
sensitivities reflecting their stages of economic 
development. 
The EFTA States can be proud of what they have 
achieved so far. I remain confident that they will be 
able to meet the challenges of the future.  
Signing of EFTA-Ukraine FTA, Reykjavik, June 2010.
direct investment. The global economy has, in many 
ways, become the natural operating environment for 
many EFTA companies. Several of them are world 
leaders in sectors such as machinery, shipbuilding and 
pharmaceuticals. The EFTA countries are home to 16 
of the world’s 500 largest companies. In addition, they 
provide a bridge to the larger European market through 
their close links with neighbouring countries. 
To use my country, the Principality of Liechtenstein, 
as an example: although small, it has a very well 
developed and remarkably diversified economy. Like 
the other EFTA States, Liechtenstein’s economy is 
highly industrialised and home to several leading 
companies in their respective fields of activity. The 
product base of Liechtenstein’s companies is varied 
and has tended to focus on specialised high-tech 
sectors. More than a third of its products are exported 
to markets outside Europe. The importance of the 
manufacturing sector is strikingly high, as it contributes 
close to 40% of GDP and employs over 40% of the 
workforce. Liechtenstein’s industries also have 
significant investments abroad. Overall, they keep four 
times more employees on their payroll abroad than at 
home. As in the other EFTA countries, trade in services 
is of equally high importance to the economy with, in 
the case of Liechtenstein, the financial services sector 
playing a particularly significant role.
The EFTA countries have successfully built an 
extensive network of FTAs and have a stake in 
enlarging it further. Going down this road is not 
without challenges. The landscape of global trade is 
changing rapidly. Regional “mega” initiatives – such 
as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership between the 
European Union and the United States, and the 
plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement – have the 
potential to set new global standards and create new 
operating systems for global trade. EFTA will follow 
these developments closely and adjust accordingly. 
The further proliferation of FTAs puts pressure on 
limited trade negotiating capacity and, in some cases, 
creates challenges for countries wishing to enter into 
new negotiations. In addition, a difficult economic 
environment, marked by currency depreciations and 
persistent negative trade balances, has given rise to 
public scepticism towards economic liberalisation in 
many countries. Against this background, and to be in 
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Marine Harvest Group, headquartered in Bergen, is Norway’s biggest food producer. As a leader in farmed salmon, 
the company has a presence in 22 countries and 10 200 employees worldwide. In October 2013, Marine Harvest 
opened its first processing plant in Seoul, Korea.
Since the entry into force of the free trade agreement between EFTA and the Republic of Korea in 2006, exports 
of Norwegian salmon to Korea have increased from 3 600 to 8 300 tons, representing half of Korea’s total salmon 
imports.
“Asia is an exciting region for us. Its markets for salmon have an annual growth 
rate of around 10 to 15%. Free trade agreements such as the one between EFTA 
and Korea are important to us and other Norwegian seafood companies, as they 
provide free access to markets that are “hungry” for salmon. We hope to see more 
agreements like this going forward, China and Russia being high on our list. 
Marine Harvest’s new processing plant in Seoul will provide Korean consumers 
with better access to fresh, high-quality salmon, making it available within 
36 to 48 hours of harvesting on the Norwegian coastline. This is thanks to our 
competent and efficient organisation, which is able to implement a growth 
strategy fast, based on consumer insight, branding and local presence”, says 
Marine Harvest’s CEO, Alf-Helge Aarskog.  
BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES: Marine Harvest, Norway 
Korea Chooses Salmon for Dinner
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Ivo Kaufmann
Deputy Secretary-General of EFTA
Head of Trade Relations
EFTA’s Evolving Free Trade 
Relations
Intra-EFTA Trade Relations
For over 50 years, the European Free Trade 
Association has provided its Member States with a 
platform for pursuing economic and trade objectives. 
The Stockholm Convention, which entered into force 
in 1960, was set up to create a free trade area among 
the seven founding members of EFTA (see Table 1: 
EFTA Membership 1960-2013). By the mid-1960s, 
industrial tariffs and quantitative restrictions on 
goods had successfully been eliminated. While trade 
in processed agricultural products, as well as fish and 
other marine products, was also covered under the 
rules of the free trade area, basic agricultural products 
would be dealt with in bilateral arrangements between 
the individual EFTA States. The original Convention 
was updated regularly and more broadly revised in 
2001 to take account of economic and regulatory 
developments. This “Vaduz Convention” continues 
to govern intra-EFTA trade relations and provides the 
common backbone of EFTA trade policy. 
PART I:  
Going Global – Overview of 
EFTA’s Free Trade Relations
Table 1: EFTA Membership 1960-2013
Member States Accession Withdrawal
Austria 1960 1995
Denmark 1960 1973
Finland* 1986 1995
Iceland 1970
Liechtenstein 1991
Norway 1960
Portugal 1960 1986
Sweden 1960 1995
Switzerland 1960
United Kingdom 1960 1973
* Associate member from 1961 to 1986.
Trade Relations with the European 
Union
Since the inception of EFTA, its Member States have 
strived for coherence in economic and trade relations 
with the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
its successors, the European Communities (EC) and 
the European Union (EU). By the late 1960s, having 
established a functioning free trade area, the EFTA 
States shifted their focus towards finding suitable 
arrangements with the EEC. This resulted in a series of 
bilateral free trade agreements between the individual 
EFTA States and the EEC, which entered into force 
in 1973 and provided for the gradual reduction and 
elimination of import duties on industrial goods. 
Virtually all such duties were eliminated by 1977, 
with remaining tariffs on certain “sensitive” products 
being dismantled by 1984. Between 1984 and 1989, 
the EFTA States and the EC concluded a number of 
additional agreements in trade-related areas, such as 
on standards and technical barriers to trade (TBT). 
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European Union) was initiated as far back as 1967 
when EFTA established a joint working group with 
former Yugoslavia, which by 1983 had evolved into a 
Joint EFTA-Yugoslavia Committee. The EFTA States 
as a group also negotiated an FTA with Spain, which 
entered into force in 1980 and expired in 1985 upon 
Spain’s accession to the EEC. 
Beyond these early initiatives, EFTA’s third-country 
policy can be traced back to June 1990, when a 
decision was taken in Gothenburg to develop EFTA’s 
own network of FTAs, in parallel to that of the EC. The 
initial impetus was to avoid discrimination vis-à-vis 
economic operators from the EC, which was working 
towards a free trade area with the former centrally-
planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe. 
At first, the EFTA States entered into agreements with 
Poland, Romania, the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
Bulgaria and Hungary (1992-1993). In parallel, they 
followed the EC in concluding FTAs with Turkey 
(1991) and Israel (1992).
In 1995, the EFTA States decided to broaden the 
geographical scope of EFTA’s free trade policy 
beyond the immediate confines of Europe to follow the 
Collectively, these agreements provided the basis for 
closer and more substantial cooperation within Europe. 
Economic integration increased substantially with the 
establishment in 1994 of the European Economic Area 
(EEA). Beyond the mere consolidation of bilateral trade 
links, the EEA Agreement extended significant areas 
of the EU’s Internal Market to the participating EFTA 
States – today Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. 
For its part, Switzerland chose to pursue bilateral 
arrangements with the European Union by concluding 
sectoral agreements in a wide range of fields, including 
the movement of persons, transport and TBT. These 
arrangements have allowed Switzerland to participate 
to a considerable extent in the Internal Market without 
being part of the institutional framework governing the 
EEA.
Trade Relations with Third 
Countries
In addition to consolidating their relations with the 
EEC/EU, the EFTA States have established a successful 
third-country trade policy. Engagement with so-called 
“third countries” (i.e. partners outside EFTA and the 
Launch of free trade negotiations with the customs union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, Geneva, November 2010.
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augmented by new initiatives, which seek economic 
opportunities in the global marketplace. 
Scope of the EFTA Free Trade 
Network 
Economic Importance and 
Geographical Coverage
Trade plays an essential role for the economies 
of the EFTA States. In 2012, the combined value 
of merchandise trade of the four EFTA Member 
States stood at over USD 680 billion, while trade in 
commercial services was valued at USD 235 billion. 
Exports accounted for about 60% of these totals. 
Collectively, the EFTA States were the twelfth largest 
merchandise trader globally and were ranked sixth 
in commercial services trade (counting the European 
Union as one). They are also significant investors 
abroad. The EFTA States, therefore, have an important 
stake in developing and maintaining an extensive 
FTA network (see Table 2 on economic indicators, 
illustrating the importance of trade and investment in 
the EFTA States).
European Union in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The 
first agreements concluded in that context were with 
Morocco in 1997 and with the Palestinian Authority in 
1998. With Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia, EFTA 
signed joint declarations on cooperation (JDCs)1, 
which subsequently developed into FTAs. Meanwhile, 
EFTA’s network in Europe was expanding with the 
signing of FTAs with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Slovenia.
The next phase in the evolution of EFTA’s third-
country relations began in the late 1990s. Facing a 
multiplication of bilateral and regional preferential 
trade agreements following the conclusion of the 
multilateral “Uruguay Round” and the establishment 
of the WTO in 1994, the EFTA States began to extend 
their free trade policy towards interested partners 
overseas. Since the start of its negotiations with 
Canada in 1998, EFTA has successfully concluded 
FTAs with a range of partners from the Americas, Asia 
and Africa. The principal driver of this global approach 
has been the interest in securing a competitive position 
for EFTA’s economic operators on international 
markets. The traditional paradigm of securing a level 
playing field with the European Union has thus been 
1 Joint declarations on cooperation address cooperation on trade-related issues, such as customs matters, and may be a first step 
towards free trade relations with the partners concerned.
Table 2: Economic Indicators 2012: Merchandise Trade, Trade in Services and Investment  
(million USD)
  Iceland Liechtenstein* Norway Switzerland EFTA**
Exports: merchandise goods 5 063 n.a. 161 025 225 949 392 037
Imports: merchandise goods 4 771 n.a. 87 316 197 787 289 874
Exports: commercial services 3 031 n.a. 43 815 90 153 136 999
Imports: commercial services 2 758 n.a. 48 889 46 606 98 253
Total trade 15 623 n.a. 341 045 560 495 917 163
Total trade balance 565 n.a. 68 635 71 709 140 909
Trade to GDP ratio (2009-2011, as %) 103.3 n.a. 71.0 111.8 n.a.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) outward stock 10 178 n.a. 216 083 1 129 376 1 355 637
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inward stock 12 378 n.a. 191 103 665 596 869 077
Source: WTO and UNCTAD (FDI), October 2013
n.a. = not available
*  Merchandise trade and FDI data for Liechtenstein are included in the data for Switzerland. In 2012, Liechtenstein’s direct exports and 
imports (i.e. excluding trade with Switzerland) were valued at USD 3 158 million and USD 1 737 million respectively.
**  Trade figures include intra-EFTA trade.
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list of EFTA’s FTAs and JDCs with third countries is 
available in Annex I. 
The geographical reach of the EFTA free trade network 
has expanded significantly over time (see Figure 1). 
With the addition of Montenegro in 2011, and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in 2013, EFTA now has over 98% 
of merchandise trade with European partners 
covered under preferential trade agreements. As for 
the remaining 2%, EFTA is currently engaged in FTA 
negotiations with the customs union of Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan, which accounts for the biggest part of 
the difference. 
EFTA is currently focusing a great deal of its ongoing 
efforts on the dynamic Asia-Pacific region which, as a 
whole, represents EFTA’s second largest international 
market (with USD 98 billion worth of merchandise 
trade). Here, EFTA is engaged in negotiations with 
India, Indonesia and Vietnam, while processes 
with Malaysia and Thailand have been launched or 
are pending resumption. In the Americas, EFTA 
has concluded FTAs with Mexico, Chile, Canada, 
Colombia, Peru, Costa Rica and Panama, which 
collectively account for about a fifth of merchandise 
trade with this part of the world. Negotiations are 
Today, EFTA has one of the world’s largest FTA 
networks. In addition to participating in the Internal 
Market of the European Union through the EEA 
Agreement and the bilateral Swiss-EU arrangements, 
the EFTA States currently maintain 25 third-country 
agreements with 35 partners worldwide. In addition, 
six JDCs are in force. 
As the EFTA States are not obliged by the EFTA 
Convention to conclude preferential trade agreements 
as a group, they maintain the option of entering into 
bilateral third-country arrangements. In that sense, the 
EFTA network is supplemented by bilateral agreements 
between all the EFTA States and the Faroe Islands, 
which date back to the early 1990s, a bilateral FTA 
between Switzerland and Japan (in force since 2009), 
and the bilateral FTAs of Iceland and Switzerland with 
China (signed in 2013). It should also be noted that, 
as a result of the enlargement of the European Union 
in 2004, 2007 and 2013, the FTAs previously in place 
with the 13 respective acceding states were replaced 
by the relevant arrangements between the EFTA 
States and the European Union – the EEA Agreement 
for Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, and the 
bilateral treaties for Switzerland. A comprehensive 
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2007: FTAs with Bulgaria and 
Romania are terminated as part 
of their accession to the EU.
  
2005: FTA 
signed with 
the Republic 
of Korea.  
2006: FTA
with SACU.
2007: FTA
with Egypt.
2009: FTAs 
with the GCC,
Albania and 
Serbia.
2008: FTAs 
with Canada
and Colombia.
2010: FTAs 
with Peru
and Ukraine.
2011: FTAs with 
Hong Kong 
China and 
Montenegro.
Table 3: Evolution of EFTA Merchandise Trade (Imports and Exports), 2005-2012
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Table 4: Direction of EFTA Merchandise Trade (Imports and Exports), 2005-2012
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partners is today valued at 
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Table 5: The Growing Share of Third-Country FTAs in EFTA’s Merchandise Trade, 2005-2012
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may contain imported materials without losing their 
preferential status under the agreements. 
In addition to these elements, the “first generation” 
of EFTA free trade agreements (concluded mainly in 
the 1990s with partners in the Euro-Mediterranean 
region) typically feature provisions on sanitary 
and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and TBT, trade 
remedies (e.g. safeguard measures) and the protection 
of intellectual property rights. Rules on competition 
aim to ensure that trade liberalisation under the FTA 
is not hampered by business practices that restrict or 
distort competition.
A “second generation” of EFTA free trade agreements 
has added substantive rules and commitments on 
services, investment and/or public procurement, 
thereby responding more broadly to opportunities and 
challenges faced by businesses operating in today’s 
globalised economic environment. Building on the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of 
the WTO, these agreements provide for the further 
liberalisation of trade in services through sector-
specific commitments. With respect to investment, the 
focus lies on ensuring non-discriminatory conditions 
for the establishment of companies, subject to specific 
reservations. Bilateral investment treaties of individual 
EFTA States may complement that framework. FTAs 
containing comprehensive provisions on government 
procurement foresee access to procurement markets 
on the basis of reciprocity, non-discrimination and 
transparency, setting out the covered government 
entities. Increasingly, EFTA has also begun to include 
disciplines on trade facilitation, which are aimed at 
simplifying and accelerating the clearance of traded 
goods. 
Since 2010, in what may be called a “third generation” 
of FTAs, EFTA has begun to systematically introduce 
model provisions on sustainable development in 
its negotiating processes and reviews of existing 
agreements. These address environmental and labour 
standards insofar as they relate to trade and investment. 
FTAs containing such provisions have since been 
concluded with Hong Kong China, Montenegro, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Central American 
States of Costa Rica and Panama. Moreover, provisions 
on technical cooperation seeking to strengthen the 
capacity of developing partner countries to implement 
underway with Guatemala and Honduras. In North 
Africa and the Middle East, over 80% of EFTA’s 
merchandise trade is with partners that have concluded 
FTAs with EFTA. Negotiations with Algeria are on 
hold. In the rapidly growing Sub-Saharan African 
region, almost half of EFTA’s merchandise trade is 
conducted under the FTA concluded with the members 
of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).
The evolution of the patterns in EFTA’s merchandise 
trade is illustrated in Tables 3 and 4. While the 
European Union remains by far EFTA’s leading 
trading partner, its share in merchandise trade has 
dropped by five percentage points since 2005 (to 
68.3% in 2012). Meanwhile, the proportion of third-
country FTA partners has continued to grow. Today, 
trade with third-country FTA partners accounts for 
9.3% of overall EFTA merchandise trade and is worth 
some USD 63 billion, an almost threefold increase 
since 2005. This growth reflects not only the steady 
addition of new preferential agreements, but also 
the trade-creation effects of liberalisation measures 
implemented through FTAs. For EFTA, this trade 
expansion has been, to a large extent, export-driven, 
as evidenced by the strong growth of exports to third 
countries which has outpaced the growth in total trade 
(see Table 5). Annex II provides a comprehensive list 
of all free trade partners of the EFTA States.
Characteristics of EFTA Free Trade 
Agreements 
EFTA free trade agreements typically foresee the 
elimination of import duties on industrial goods, 
including fish and other marine products, and provide 
for tariff concessions on processed agricultural products 
and selected basic agricultural products. While, in 
principle, EFTA grants duty-free access for so-called 
“processed agricultural products” (e.g. chocolate and 
soup), certain measures are maintained to compensate 
for higher costs of raw materials used by the processing 
industries of the EFTA States. Concessions on basic 
agricultural products (e.g. fruit and meat) have 
traditionally been dealt with in bilateral agreements 
concluded between the individual EFTA States and 
partner countries, which form an integral part of the 
FTAs. All EFTA free trade agreements contain rules 
of origin, which establish the extent to which products 
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conducting negotiations. In each negotiating process, 
one of the chief negotiators of the four EFTA States 
is designated as the EFTA spokesperson, and the 
same applies for the expert groups negotiating the 
different parts of an FTA. Where national regulatory 
frameworks and interests may differ, such as in 
services, investment and government procurement, 
country-specific commitments are taken. Bilateral 
solutions are typically negotiated for basic agricultural 
products. 
Completed FTAs are signed and ratified by each 
Member State. The EFTA Secretariat, through the 
Trade Relations Division, fulfils a coordination 
function in providing substantive and logistical 
support to Member States in respect of the preparation, 
negotiation and maintenance of FTAs. 
With a view to also promoting preferential trade 
relations with developing economies, EFTA has 
avoided applying a “one-size-fits-all” approach, but 
seeks to adapt to the varied interests of its negotiating 
partners. For instance, while the EFTA States would 
offer immediate preferential access to their markets, 
developing-country partners could benefit from 
and benefit from FTAs are found in an increasing 
number of EFTA free trade agreements.
Finally, all EFTA free trade agreements contain 
institutional and other horizontal provisions, notably 
establishing a joint committee to administer the FTA, 
as well as mechanisms for the settlement of possible 
disputes between the parties, focusing on consultations 
but, in all recent agreements, also foreseeing the 
possibility of resorting to an arbitral tribunal. 
EFTA’s Approach to Free 
Trade Negotiations and the 
Implementation of FTAs
By forming a free trade area, rather than a customs 
union, among themselves, the individual EFTA States 
have maintained authority over the management 
of their external trade policy. When it comes to 
negotiating FTAs with third countries, however, they 
have so far consistently chosen to act as a group, 
thereby combining their economic and political weight. 
Accordingly, the EFTA States have developed common 
approaches and positions, and internal coordination 
continues to play an important role in preparing and 
Negotiating round between EFTA and the Central American States of Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama, Geneva, March 2012.
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EFTA notifies the WTO’s Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements on a regular basis of all relevant 
developments with regard to its free trade relations. 
Conclusion
EFTA’s free trade interests have been pursued 
pragmatically. Building on the EFTA Convention, 
the EFTA States’ close ties with the European Union 
and the multilateral framework of the World Trade 
Organization, one of the world’s largest networks 
of preferential trade agreements has emerged over 
the past two decades. EFTA’s trade relations with 
third countries continue to evolve, with a number of 
trade negotiations currently underway and existing 
agreements being revised and updated.
longer phase-in periods to implement market access 
commitments. Technical cooperation and capacity-
building, as referred to above, also play an important 
role in some negotiations.
The operation of EFTA free trade agreements 
is overseen by joint committees, composed of 
representatives of the EFTA States and their respective 
partner. These committees meet regularly to evaluate 
the functioning of the FTA, as well as the need for any 
updates or additions. Since 2012, EFTA’s activities 
with existing partners have been assessed in line with 
a new general approach which puts emphasis on the 
comprehensive further development of FTAs, such as 
with regard to market access commitments or chapters 
on sustainable development.
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Based in Liechtenstein, Neutrik AG is a company manufacturing professional connectors and connector systems for 
the entertainment industry. Neutrik was founded in 1975 and its products can be found on stage, in stadiums and in 
the studio. 
“In view of the company’s export share of 99%, Neutrik AG, unsurprisingly, 
benefits from the free trade agreements that EFTA has concluded with many 
countries worldwide. This applies in particular to non-European states. Owing to 
the positive development of markets in the Far East, the FTA with Hong Kong China 
is of particular importance to our company, given the pivotal role of Hong Kong 
for Chinese contract manufacturers in South China. The FTA with the Republic of 
Korea has created better general conditions for us in what is still a difficult market, 
where any reduction of import obstacles contributes towards the competitiveness 
of foreign suppliers. The bilateral agreement recently concluded by Switzerland 
with the People’s Republic of China will be helpful in consolidating our position in 
the “Middle Kingdom”. 
It is a pity that, to date, no FTA exists with our largest market – the United States. Undoubtedly, the conclusion 
of an FTA with this important country would be desirable in order to prevent our competitive position from 
deteriorating further after serious drawbacks for us caused by currency issues”, says Werner Bachmann, CEO 
of Neutrik Group.
BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES: Neutrik, Liechtenstein 
The Sound of Music
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The Value of the EFTA  
“Free Trade Mark”
 
Martin Eyjólfsson, Iceland
Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the International 
Organisations in Geneva
EFTA’s third-country policy has evolved over the 
years – from mirroring the European Union’s 
approach to external economic relations in the 
1990s to taking a more proactive and ambitious 
approach with partners worldwide. In what ways 
have EFTA’s free trade agreements contributed to 
achieving Iceland’s economic goals?
As a small economy, Iceland is highly dependent on 
international trade and favourable access to foreign 
markets. We have a wide network of international 
agreements that Icelandic companies rely on heavily 
in their day-to-day operations. Iceland’s trade policy 
rests on three pillars: The EEA Agreement, WTO 
membership and trade agreements in the broadest 
sense. Our free trade agreements form the backbone 
of the last pillar, which also includes an expanding 
network of double taxation, air services and investment 
protection agreements. As trade negotiators, our job 
is to provide Icelandic companies with open and 
predictable market access conditions around the world. 
PART II:  
The Inside View – Interviews 
with Chief Negotiators
Iceland’s trade policy thus contributes to job creation, 
economic growth and opportunities for our companies 
and citizens alike. 
Let’s consider, for example, the ongoing EFTA 
negotiations with our Eastern European partners of 
the customs union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, 
which will create considerably better access conditions 
for our leading fishery exports in important markets. 
I could also refer to a newly updated Air Services 
Agreement with Canada which enabled Icelandair not 
only to double the number of its destinations in that 
country but also to increase flight frequency to current 
destinations. This created valuable jobs in Iceland 
and increased tourist flow between the two countries. 
I should also mention the recently concluded FTA 
between Iceland and China. This agreement will give 
Icelandic companies a competitive advantage since 
Iceland was the first European country to sign an FTA 
with China. 
The EFTA States have consistently given 
preference to negotiating FTAs with third 
countries as a group. What have been the 
advantages of this approach for Iceland? 
The EFTA States punch far above their weight in terms 
of world trade, yet we are still small. The simple truth 
is that we are more attractive to potential partners as 
a group than as individual states. EFTA trade policy 
is a success story, and our track record of far reaching 
and comprehensive FTAs – in five continents – speaks 
for itself. 
Although Iceland has also concluded FTAs on a 
bilateral basis, most recently with China, it is my 
personal belief that Iceland’s opportunities are 
considerably increased when attached to the EFTA 
“Free Trade Mark”.
“The EFTA States 
punch far above 
their weight in 
terms of world 
trade.”
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I think it is safe to say that we will intensify our trade 
relations with Canada – most notably in the field of 
services. Formal negotiations could be launched in 
a relatively ambitious timeframe. At the same time, 
all the EFTA States and Canada are taking part in 
the so-called “TISA” (Trade in Services Agreement) 
negotiations in the context of the World Trade 
Organization. While you could say that we are hedging 
our bets, we may succeed on both fronts.
Embarking on free trade negotiations with the United 
States has been more complicated and difficult, as 
there are many factors to consider. However, some 
of these might change or are already changing. The 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) negotiations between the European Union 
and the United States could be a game-changer in 
the longer term. Likewise, the inability of the WTO 
to show progress in the Doha Round could make an 
EFTA bilateral approach with the United States a more 
pressing issue. 
One of the most challenging issues connected with 
possible free trade negotiations between the EFTA 
States and the United States would be the sensitive 
area of agriculture. We will, however, cross that bridge 
when the time comes.
We should not forget that our favourable access to the 
European Union – by far our most important market – 
can be attributed to EFTA cooperation. Each individual 
EFTA State could never have attained similar 
negotiating results with the EU as the EFTA bloc did 
in the early 1990s. The EEA Agreement is probably the 
biggest success story of EFTA.
EFTA has a “first generation” FTA with Canada 
that essentially focuses on trade in goods, while 
with the United States no preferential trade 
negotiations have been conducted to date. 
Against this background, what are the main 
future challenges for EFTA with North American 
partners from an Icelandic perspective? 
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“…on trade topics 
currently outside 
the realm of the 
WTO, bilateral 
arrangements can 
create their own 
set of rules…”
Overall, the answer is yes, but the degree will vary from 
one topic to another. On market access, for instance, if 
the new regional agreements deepen the liberalisation 
process or advance existing bilateral rules, then 
they shall prevail. The same logic applies to trade 
disciplines. If the result is deeper, more sophisticated 
and precise, then the plurilateral regional treaty shall 
prevail. Nevertheless, due to the number and diversity 
of participants, inter-regional agreements are naturally 
more complex. Thus, it is likely that the substitution 
effect (one treaty over the others) might be delayed, 
because the new agreement would have a slower tariff 
reduction/elimination schedule. For example, when the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was 
negotiated, a previous bilateral agreement between the 
United States and Canada continued to be partially 
enforced.
Like EFTA, Chile has developed an extensive 
worldwide network of FTAs, while remaining 
committed to the WTO’s multilateral trade 
agenda. What, from a Chilean perspective, are 
the advantages and limitations of bilateral/
regional trade liberalisation when compared 
with the multilateral approach?
Bilateral processes always go beyond the WTO. 
The clearest example is market access negotiations, 
where bilateral agreements tend to achieve the total 
elimination of customs tariffs. On the trade disciplines 
side, the situation is more complex. Indeed, under 
existing WTO rules, bilateral treaties cannot go too 
far. At most they can provide additional precision and 
clarity. Nevertheless, on trade topics currently outside 
the realm of the WTO, bilateral arrangements can 
create their own set of rules without much restraint. 
For instance on investments, competition policy and 
standards, the space for innovation is open. That being 
said, there are areas that cannot be advanced bilaterally, 
simply because the implications are multilateral. Such 
is the case with the elimination of export subsidies in 
agriculture, or the substantial reduction of financial 
support for farming. Moreover, from a systemic 
perspective, an increasingly globalised and harmonised 
world cannot operate properly without universal rules. 
In our time at least, bilateral agreements will never be 
able to replace the multilateral trading system.
Preferential Trade 
Arrangements: What is at Stake?
 
Mario Matus, Chile
Ambassador to the WTO, WIPO and UNCTAD
Between 1997 and 2004, bilateral merchandise 
trade between Chile and the EFTA States grew 
at an average annual rate of 2.4% (Chilean 
exports to EFTA: 2.7%). Since the entry into 
force of the EFTA-Chile Free Trade Agreement in 
December 2004, annual growth has averaged 
13.2% (Chilean exports to EFTA: 10.3%). Is this 
development in line with Chile’s experience of 
preferential trade arrangements with other 
partner countries? What, in your view, are the 
main contributing factors to the success of these 
agreements?  
That is indeed the case. Once a treaty enters into force, 
the pattern is one of significant growth in bilateral trade. 
In my opinion, there are two reasons for such success. 
The first factor is the elimination of or substantial 
reduction in customs tariffs. This creates immediate 
comparative advantages for exports entering the other 
party’s market. The second element is awareness. Due 
to media coverage, the negotiation process catches 
the attention of people who would otherwise not have 
been aware of it. In other words, a country becomes 
“visible” to a broader audience. Likewise, the export 
industry – consulted throughout the negotiation 
process – would update the commercial information 
available on the country or economy in question.  
Chile is an active participant in several inter-
regional economic projects, such as the Trans-
Pacific Partnership and the Pacific Alliance. Are 
these emerging regional blocs likely to establish 
new yardsticks and replace pre-existing bilateral 
FTAs? 
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“The global business model of Schindler is based 
on open doors to local markets. Thus, free trade 
agreements are very important to our business. 
The dynamics will even increase the importance of 
FTAs: The more Schindler invests in local markets to 
provide products and services, the more important 
market access becomes. 
For Schindler, FTAs have two main benefits: They 
reduce barriers to entry in markets and they 
increase legal security. In addition, they improve 
contacts between the ministries involved. This 
allows for faster solutions to specific issues, which 
has a positive effect on the economies of both 
sides. In addition to tariff reductions, the scope of 
modern FTAs encompasses intellectual property, 
access to service markets, investment and 
government procurement. These non-tariff parts of 
FTAs make concluding international transactions 
considerably easier. 
One important aspect is regional integration. 
Schindler has many manufacturing locations on 
all continents. EFTA free trade agreements and 
regional trade agreements aid the expansion of 
regional production facilities and competence 
centres as parts of our global supply chain. Finally, 
FTAs can facilitate the movement of employees, 
e.g. for training, engineering or management 
functions”, says Christoph Lindenmeyer, 
Chairman of Schindler Management AG.
BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES: Schindler Management, Switzerland
To the Top
Hong Kong’s tallest building, the 118-storey high International Commerce 
Centre, is served by 81 Schindler lifts. 
Founded in Switzerland in 1874, the Schindler Group is 
a leading global provider of lifts, escalators and related 
services. Its innovative and environmentally friendly 
access and transit-management systems make an important 
contribution to mobility in urban societies. Schindler 
mobility solutions move one billion people every day all 
over the world. In 2012, the Schindler Group generated 
sales of more than CHF 8.2 billion. It has 47 000 employees 
in more than 100 countries. 
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between partners at different levels of development is, 
of course, understandable. The challenge therefore is 
to capture the rapidly evolving regulatory regimes of 
some partner countries by applying a more dynamic 
approach to FTA commitments.
Several of EFTA’s free trade agreements have 
now been in force for a decade or more and/
or have a limited substantive scope, e.g. not yet 
covering areas such as services and investment, 
government procurement or sustainable 
development. What is the case for upgrading 
these agreements, and what are the main 
challenges linked to such an endeavour?
The maintenance of existing agreements is becoming 
an increasingly important part of EFTA’s work. The 
joint committees under the corresponding FTAs 
usually meet on a biannual basis and provide a forum 
for updating and further developing EFTA’s current 25 
agreements with 35 different countries. 
Some of the agreements originate in the early nineties. 
Their scope is far less relevant to businesses, in both 
EFTA and partner countries, than the newer, more 
comprehensive agreements. Even some of these 
recent agreements do not always have the full and 
comprehensive scope that we normally seek to obtain. 
Some would argue that trade with these partners has 
therefore not been developed to its full potential. 
EFTA has a busy agenda negotiating new FTAs with 
several partners simultaneously. With an increasing 
number of possible new partners in the pipeline, the 
capacity to update/renegotiate older FTAs also comes 
into question. Moreover, the structure and scope of our 
FTAs has undergone a transformation – from FTAs that 
mainly focus on trade in goods to FTAs encompassing 
virtually all relevant aspects of modern trade. This 
implies that “updating” older agreements will rapidly 
lead to the negotiation of fully-fledged, modern FTAs. 
If our partners are equally motivated to give priority to 
such modernisation, the prospects of success are good.
How does Norway involve domestic stakeholders 
when preparing for and conducting negotiations 
with free trade partners? 
In Norway, the work carried out in relation to FTA 
negotiations has broad support in Parliament, the 
Capturing the Full Potential
Sveinung Røren, Norway 
Director, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Trade Policy Department
The EFTA States are engaged in free trade 
negotiations with an increasingly diverse 
set of partners, at various levels of economic 
development, and with distinctive sensitivities 
and interests. In what ways may EFTA adjust 
its approach to such evolving needs and 
challenges?
EFTA has a history of being pragmatic and flexible 
in its approach to free trade partners at various levels 
of economic development, while maintaining its 
ambition to conclude free trade agreements that are 
as comprehensive as possible. This comprehensive 
approach is a reflection of the evolution of modern 
trade, which is characterised by the close interaction 
between trade in goods and services, investment and 
intellectual property rights. 
With this in mind, EFTA needs to adapt to the different 
needs of countries at various levels of economic 
development. In the areas of services, government 
procurement and investment, partners undertake FTA 
commitments that largely correspond to the level 
of domestic regulation at the time the agreement is 
signed. This implies that, for some partners, the level 
of liberalisation bound under the FTA may remain 
far below the level offered by the EFTA countries. 
However, the domestic regulations of some emerging 
economy partners may develop rapidly towards 
an entirely new and “modern” regime, compared 
with the relatively low level committed in the FTA. 
Maintaining a certain asymmetry in commitments 
“…’updating’ older 
agreements will 
rapidly lead to the 
negotiation of fully-
fledged, modern FTAs.”
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business community and the business associations, as 
well as among the trade unions. Before every EFTA 
Ministerial meeting, the Minister of Trade and Industry 
meets with the Norwegian members of EFTA’s 
advisory bodies – the Parliamentary Committee 
and the Consultative Committee. Regular meetings 
regarding ongoing and upcoming negotiations are also 
held between the Minister of Trade and Industry and all 
interested stakeholders. Consultations are conducted 
with the business community in connection with the 
various negotiations to ensure that Norwegian export 
interests are covered. In addition, stakeholders are 
encouraged to give feedback to the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry concerning matters related to Norway’s 
FTAs through the Ministry’s webpage.
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In cases where others do not have FTAs yet, our 
agreements provide a competitive advantage to Swiss-
based operators and contribute to the diversification of 
our foreign economic relations. For their part, Swiss 
consumers and producers benefit from economic 
growth in the Swiss marketplace and enjoy a greater 
variety of higher-quality goods and services at lower 
prices. FTAs are therefore an important instrument 
for maintaining and strengthening Switzerland’s 
competitiveness and prosperity.
The EFTA Convention does not oblige the EFTA 
States to negotiate and conclude FTAs as a 
group. While Switzerland has concluded 36 
FTAs under the EFTA umbrella (12 of which with 
countries that have in the meantime become 
members of the European Union), it recently 
entered into bilateral FTAs with Japan and 
China. For what reasons does Switzerland seek 
preferential trade relations through EFTA, and 
why was a different route chosen with Japan and 
China? 
Switzerland favours the conclusion of preferential 
trade agreements within the EFTA framework. The 
EFTA States are in many respects like-minded and 
carry more economic and political weight as a group, 
making them more attractive to trading partners. 
Nevertheless, Switzerland and the other EFTA 
States also retain the possibility of concluding FTAs 
bilaterally. 
Switzerland and Japan initiated regular bilateral 
economic consultations in 1995, in which both 
countries explored the possibility of deepening 
economic relations through an FTA. Negotiations with 
EFTA as a group were considered, but ruled out early 
on by Japan due to differences between Japan’s trade 
structure and that of individual EFTA States.
As for China, while the EFTA States were willing 
to negotiate as a group, China made it clear from 
the outset that it would prefer individual bilateral 
negotiations with each EFTA State. So far, Iceland and 
Switzerland have signed bilateral FTAs with China (in 
April and July 2013, respectively).
What are the main challenges in negotiating 
FTAs with a large developing partner country 
such as India?
Strengthening Competitiveness
Marie-Gabrielle Ineichen-Fleisch, Switzerland 
State Secretary and Director of the State Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs (SECO)
What is the importance of EFTA free trade 
agreements for Swiss business operators and 
consumers? Do they provide a satisfactory 
alternative to progress under the multilateral 
framework of the World Trade Organization?
Switzerland’s free trade policy is aimed at improving 
the general framework for conducting economic 
relations with relevant economic partners and at 
providing Swiss companies with legally secure, 
unobstructed, predictable and non-discriminatory 
market access.
Switzerland is closely integrated in the world economy. 
As the country’s economic structure is outward-
oriented, its prosperity largely depends on international 
trade in goods and services as well as on cross-border 
investment activities. The continuous improvement of 
market access conditions therefore represents a core 
objective of Swiss foreign economic policy. The best 
way to achieve this objective is through the multilateral 
framework of the WTO. Nevertheless, most countries 
have started to enter into bilateral/plurilateral, regional 
or supra-regional FTAs. This is seen as a way to 
complement multilateral trade liberalisation efforts, 
which are currently facing difficulties. 
For Switzerland, FTAs represent an opportunity for 
providing business operators with better market access 
at conditions equivalent to those enjoyed by their most 
important foreign competitors (such as operators from 
the European Union, the United States and Japan). 
“FTAs are an 
important instrument 
for maintaining 
and strengthening 
Switzerland’s 
competitiveness and 
prosperity.”
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their growth potential, they are well aware of their 
attractiveness as FTA partners. 
Switzerland’s main offensive interests are in the 
areas of trade in industrial goods, trade in services, 
intellectual property rights, government procurement, 
and trade and sustainable development. Emerging 
economies may have both offensive and defensive 
interests in these areas and are often not ready to open 
up sectors in which they wish to develop their own 
industries first. 
Some prospective partners do not consider human 
rights, as well as labour and environmental standards, 
as trade-related issues, and fear the existence of a 
hidden protectionist agenda. The latter is certainly not 
a motivation for the EFTA States. However, given the 
absence of international models for incorporating these 
issues into trade agreements, a lot of work is needed in 
order to convince partners of our approach. 
These are some of the challenges that Switzerland and 
the other EFTA States have to face in expanding our 
FTA network to important emerging economies.
The offensive and defensive interests of large emerging 
economies and the highly developed economies of 
the EFTA countries may differ substantially, despite 
the existence of economic complementarities. 
Furthermore, because of the size of their domestic 
markets, large emerging economies are less dependent 
on opportunities abroad. At the same time, given 
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Heimaey VE 1, owned by Ísfélag Vestmannaeyja. Built in Chile and designed in Norway, this new generation pelagic vessel is a symbol of cooperation 
between EFTA free trade partners.  
Iceland’s oldest company, Ísfélag Vestmannaeyja, was established in 1901. Today, it is one of the country’s largest 
seafood companies. It has two factories in the Westman Islands off the south coast of Iceland and two in Thorshöfn in 
the north eastern part of the country, with operations divided into three main categories: fishing, fish processing, and 
fish meal and fish oil production. The company’s main markets are the European Union, Eastern Europe and Japan.
“Our company, along with other Icelandic seafood companies, has benefited 
greatly from Iceland’s participation in EFTA. In the 1970s, after Iceland became a 
member of EFTA, 60% of the customs tariffs imposed on our fishery products were 
wiped out when exported to other EFTA States and the European Union. When 
Iceland joined the European Economic Area in 1994, only 10% of our products 
were left with any tariffs. Today, we follow with keen interest EFTA’s free trade 
negotiations with partners from Eastern Europe, another important market for us. 
It is our hope that a free trade agreement with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan will 
bring our export duties to zero, thereby further increasing our competitive edge in 
these countries”, says Stefán Friðriksson, CEO of Ísfélag Vestmannaeyja.  
BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES: Ísfélag Vestmannaeyja, Iceland
 Iceland’s Oldest Company
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The economies of Indonesia and the EFTA 
States are different in several respects, such as 
in terms of their size, growth rate and level of 
development. What, in your view, are the main 
advantages and challenges of such differences 
when it comes to negotiating preferential trade 
agreements?
The differences between the economies of Indonesia 
and the EFTA States do indeed offer clear and 
advantageous complementarities that should be 
exploited effectively. At the same time, in order to 
ensure mutual benefits, this asymmetrical pairing 
requires unconventional and innovative approaches, 
in which even the notion of reciprocity should be 
addressed in a particular manner.
In your negotiations with EFTA, Indonesia has to 
work with four partner countries. What, in your 
experience, are the particular dynamics and 
challenges involved with such a situation? 
As a matter of fact, it is not a completely new situation 
for us. Indonesia has had some similar experiences 
from the opposite side of the table, namely with the 
“ASEAN plus one” negotiating format. Complications 
may arise if a common policy does not exist in a 
particular area, such as agricultural policy, as is the case 
for the EFTA States. In such scenarios, a solution has 
to be found that integrates sub-agreements, negotiated 
individually with each EFTA Member State, into the 
main agreement between Indonesia and EFTA.
The Benefits of Cooperation
Soemadi Brotodiningrat, Indonesia
Ambassador
Indonesia has a young and rapidly growing 
population of around 250 million. In what ways 
do you think preferential trade agreements may 
contribute to meeting the economic and social 
challenges faced by your country in the coming 
years? 
While a fast-growing population with a steadily 
increasing income creates a dynamic and attractive 
market, it also poses challenges in terms of job creation 
and the development of human resources. Therefore, 
through its preferential trade agreements, Indonesia 
aims to acquire benefits including job-generating 
investments and cooperation with regard to capacity 
building.
“…through its 
preferential trade 
agreements, Indonesia 
aims to acquire 
benefits including job-
generating investments 
and cooperation with 
regard to capacity 
building.” 
“The differences 
between the economies 
of Indonesia and the 
EFTA States offer clear 
and advantageous 
complementarities that 
should be exploited 
effectively.”
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operate globally and seek to obtain a number of 
advantages through the conclusion of FTAs. The 
main features of interest are improved market access 
and/or establishment possibilities, national treatment 
guarantees, enhanced legal security and the possibility 
to transfer management personnel. EFTA’s free trade 
agreements should contain ambitious provisions to 
secure these requirements.
Sub-Saharan Africa is emerging as one of the 
most economically dynamic regions in the world. 
What perspectives do you see for EFTA to further 
engage with partner countries in that region?
A region comprising more than half of the world’s 
ten fastest-growing economies of the coming decade 
is certainly of interest to EFTA. While EFTA’s 
overall share of trade with Sub-Saharan Africa is 
still low, economic exchanges with the region are 
increasing. Similar observations can be made in regard 
of investments. Another criterion for determining 
EFTA’s priorities is the existence of, or potential for, 
discrimination compared to its main competitors. 
Therefore, EFTA has to follow relevant developments 
very closely and be prepared to deepen its trade 
relations with partners in Sub-Saharan Africa at the 
right moment.
Securing Global Access
Norbert Frick, Liechtenstein
Ambassador to the United Nations and other International 
Organisations in Geneva 
Liechtenstein’s industries have a global customer 
base in specialised markets. How has EFTA’s 
third-country policy contributed to promoting 
domestic business interests?
One of Liechtenstein’s key concerns is to ensure the 
best possible framework conditions for businesses 
based in our country. In our view, a liberalised, non-
discriminatory market access regime – together with 
national treatment guarantees – forms a very important 
component of these framework conditions. 
The industrial sector is the largest contributor to 
Liechtenstein’s gross domestic product (GDP). While 
more than half of the country’s industrial production 
is exported to Europe, a considerable part – over 
40% – is destined for third-country markets. Regular 
contact with individual companies and the Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry reveals that EFTA’s third-
country free trade agreements are highly valued and 
considered a necessity. As the private sector provides 
input and follows EFTA’s third-country policy closely, 
domestic business interests are undoubtedly met.
Apart from a strong industrial base, the area of 
financial services is important for Liechtenstein. 
How can EFTA free trade agreements strengthen 
the position of financial service providers on 
third-country markets?
Liechtenstein’s services sector is indeed very much 
specialised in financial services, notably banking, 
wealth management and insurance. Larger institutions 
“Sub-Saharan Africa, 
a region comprising 
more than half of the 
world’s ten fastest-
growing economies of 
the coming decade, is 
certainly of interest to 
EFTA.”
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Projectiondesign, headquartered in Fredrikstad, Norway, is a specialised manufacturer of high performance projectors 
used in a number of professional applications such as control room monitoring, surveillance, training, simulation and 
scientific visualisation. Projectiondesign sells its products worldwide. The company employs 150 people and has a 
turnover of over EUR 55 million.
“We see our business potential developing into new markets like Latin America 
and emerging economies such as Russia, India and China. High import duties 
effectively limit our ability to expand, and the only two alternatives are to establish 
local manufacturing or to gain market access through free trade agreements. 
For Projectiondesign, a mid-sized company, local manufacturing is too capital 
intensive and not a realistic alternative. FTAs provide the solution for our access to 
these markets”, says Jørn Eriksen, CEO of Projectiondesign.
BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES: Projectiondesign, Norway
Through the Lens
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In recent EFTA free trade agreements, the principle 
of sustainability has been reflected in the preamble as 
well as in a dedicated chapter on trade and sustainable 
development. The preamble emphasises and reaffirms 
the parties’ commitment to democracy, the rule of 
law and human rights, as set out in the Charter of 
the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, as well as respect for the fundamental 
rights and principles at work, pursuant to the relevant 
conventions of the International Labour Organization 
(ILO). In line with WTO rules, EFTA free trade 
agreements also explicitly provide for the possibility to 
take the measures necessary to protect human, animal 
or plant life or health, or relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources.
PART III: 
Policies and Politics – the 
Voice of Parliamentarians and 
Social Partners
Reconciling Economic, Social 
and Environmental Objectives
Kathy Riklin 
Member of the Swiss Parliament (National Councillor) 
Chairperson of the EFTA Parliamentary Committee 
Flexibility and pragmatism – these traditional EFTA 
values are also shared by the EFTA Parliamentary 
Committee, an advisory body in which Members 
of Parliament from Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway 
and Switzerland convene at least twice a year. In the 
past, discussions in this forum tended to focus on 
intra-EFTA issues and European affairs. Over recent 
years, however, the management of EFTA’s worldwide 
network of free trade agreements has begun to feature 
more prominently on the agenda. 
The Parliamentary Committee is informed regularly 
about ongoing and planned free trade negotiations. 
Besides seeking general information about the political 
and economic situation of EFTA’s partner countries, 
the Parliamentary Committee also attaches importance 
to issues relating to sustainable development. Of 
particular relevance to parliamentarians is the coherent 
application of economic policies with social and 
environmental objectives.
“Of particular 
relevance to 
parliamentarians 
is the coherent 
application of 
economic policies 
with social and 
environmental 
objectives.”
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FTA-related questions are discussed in an open and 
transparent manner. In recent years, visits by the EFTA 
Parliamentary Committee have taken place to Albania, 
Canada, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Panama, Russia, 
Serbia and Vietnam.
As progress under the WTO’s Doha Development 
Agenda has stalled, the number of FTAs concluded 
between individual states has risen. Against this 
background, EFTA – with its wealth of knowledge, 
flexibility, pragmatism and highly experienced staff – 
can only increase in importance.
The Parliamentary Committee is conscious of the 
importance of international competitiveness and 
supports EFTA in its free trade negotiations. Once a 
year, a delegation of the Parliamentary Committee 
pays a visit to a prospective FTA partner country. As 
the tasks of national parliaments continue to evolve, 
in both a European and global context, conducting 
activities of this type is of growing importance. Signed 
EFTA free trade agreements are subject to approval by 
national legislatures. In that perspective, it is essential 
that contacts at parliamentary level are established and 
Visit by the EFTA Parliamentary Committee to Vietnam, 2011.
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Union is negotiating with a large number of FTA 
partners, including the United States, EFTA must 
continue to monitor developments carefully so that 
the competitive position of companies from the EFTA 
States is not weakened.
While improving market access for export-oriented 
businesses is often the motivation for negotiating 
FTAs, it should not be forgotten that, for importers, 
FTAs can be equally important. These agreements 
take the long view in providing for a predictable and 
stable trading platform. For many importers, this is a 
prerequisite for entering into procurement agreements 
and long-term supply contracts.
The long-term view also plays a key role in investment 
decisions. By their nature, investments tend to be 
long term and may require a comprehensive set of 
agreements creating a predictable business framework. 
During the early phases of new business activity in a 
host country, and before the economic benefits of 
the investments become apparent, projects are often 
exposed to political risks. In this context, bilateral 
investment treaties can offer an additional safety net, 
providing protection throughout the life of the project. 
The conclusion of trade agreements through EFTA 
ought therefore to be followed up by further work on 
the promotion and protection of investments.
The EFTA States are placing increased focus on 
working conditions and workers’ rights in prospective 
partner countries. From a Norwegian perspective, 
Virke, the Enterprise Federation of Norway, agrees 
with this approach and has given its support to 
including clearer and more binding formulations in 
EFTA free trade agreements with regard to social and 
environmental standards. This is very much in line 
with the conclusions of the 2010 EFTA Ministerial 
meeting in Reykjavik.
Concerning the choice of future FTA partners, it is 
worth noting that seven out of ten of the world’s fastest-
growing economies are now in Africa. More and more 
businesses from the EFTA countries are positioning 
themselves in the African markets. The fact that EFTA 
is considering pursuing FTAs with countries from this 
region is both relevant and important.
The Importance of the Long-
Term View
Thomas Angell
Director, Virke – the Enterprise Federation of Norway
Chairperson of the EFTA Consultative Committee
There is no doubt that foreign trade pays off. It is a 
fundamental prerequisite for economic growth and 
increased wellbeing. This widely recognised fact 
has been validated by economic theory and practical 
experience. It also underpins the creation and continued 
existence of EFTA. 
These views are fully shared by the EFTA 
Consultative Committee. This advisory body includes 
representatives of labour unions and business 
associations from the four EFTA countries. Its members 
are particularly well placed to assess the relevance of 
EFTA free trade agreements to EFTA businesses, as 
well as the contribution of those agreements to the 
living standards of the countries’ citizens.
To thrive on the international scene, businesses need a 
predictable regulatory framework, rather than a power 
play environment. The World Trade Organization, 
with its multilaterally agreed set of rules, provides 
the most important such framework. For small open 
economies, such as the EFTA countries, a well 
functioning multilateral system is a necessity. To this 
date, however, the further dismantling of trade barriers 
through the WTO Doha Round has proved to be 
impossible. This gives the EFTA States added impetus 
to broaden and deepen their access to global markets 
for goods, services and investment via the FTA route. 
At the same time, it is essential for EFTA to maintain 
a competitive position on world markets vis-à-vis 
businesses from the European Union. As the European 
“To thrive on the 
international 
scene, businesses 
need a predictable 
regulatory 
framework…”
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Hilti supplies construction professionals in more than 120 countries.
The Hilti Group, headquartered in Liechtenstein, employs some 21 000 people and provides leading-edge technology 
and services to the global construction industry. The Group controls its international procurement operations and 
production facilities from Liechtenstein.  
“Free trade agreements simplify customs clearance and shorten the processing 
times of goods consignments passing between contracting states. The results 
are administrative savings and reduced customs duties. For example, the Hilti 
Group consistently utilises the Pan-European accumulation of origin between the 
European Union, EFTA and Turkey in a manufacturing alliance with production 
plants and suppliers. With Europe still being the region that generates the largest 
share of Hilti’s sales, the benefits of FTAs in this region are correspondingly large. 
However, in light of the Hilti Group’s global operations, the evolving portfolio of 
FTAs is being monitored continuously to assess the potential for savings measured 
against the administrative effort”, says Roeland Baaijens, Executive Vice President 
Logistics of the Hilti Group.
BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES: Hilti Group, Liechtenstein 
The Leading Edge
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proponents of sustainable development. This concept 
has in time been internalised by development agencies, 
the United Nations, the European Union, non-
governmental organisations and the academic society 
alike. Sustainable development has thus become the 
dominant organising principle in global development 
policy. 
The model text on sustainable development, which 
was endorsed by EFTA Ministers in 2010, has been 
used in all recent EFTA free trade negotiations. The 
agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina provides a 
good example of the model text being fully integrated 
in the final result of the negotiations, whereby the 
parties “recognise that economic development, 
social development and environmental protection are 
interdependent and mutually supportive components 
of sustainable development. They underline the 
benefit of cooperation on trade-related labour and 
environmental issues as part of a global approach to 
trade and sustainable development”.
The EFTA Consultative Committee will continue to 
support the values that the Member States have stood 
for since EFTA’s inception, including the promotion of 
the social dimension in European and world politics, 
protecting the environment and preserving equality 
between men and women.
The Role of Social Dialogue
Helga Jónsdóttir 
General Manager, Federation of State and Municipal Employees  
(BSRB), Iceland
Member of the EFTA Consultative Committee
EFTA’s Consultative Committee represents the social 
partners in the EFTA countries. Together with EFTA’s 
other advisory body, the Parliamentary Committee, it 
remains actively engaged in EFTA’s work. 
The June 2010 EFTA Ministerial meeting in Reykjavik 
marked a turning point in the role of the Consultative 
Committee, as the importance of social dialogue and 
sustainable development came clearly into focus. 
Social dialogue is a fundamental element of the 
European social model and has often played a crucial 
role in world politics. 
One can argue that, with growing frictions between 
social actors, the importance of social dialogue is 
now greater than ever before. For instance, in a 
recent statement, Public Services International – a 
global trade union federation representing 20 million 
workers worldwide – was highly critical of the 
proposed plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement 
(TISA), which is being negotiated by a group of 
WTO members. In particular, it cautioned against the 
potential negative effects of deregulation on workers, 
farmers, service users and the environment.
The Consultative Committee must remain a platform 
for addressing these types of challenges through 
dialogue and consultation between the EFTA social 
partners and the EFTA authorities.
The EFTA States have contributed to the development 
and strengthening of global norms and must continue 
to do so. In particular, they have been traditional 
“Social dialogue 
is a fundamental 
element of the 
European social 
model and has often 
played a crucial role 
in world politics.”
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Kanoria Chemicals’ subsidiary in Switzerland specialises in the design and engineering of electronic 
modules and control devices.
Kanoria Chemicals & Industries Limited (KCI) is a leading manufacturer of chemical intermediates in India. With 
over five decades of experience in the chemicals industry, KCI has started to diversify into renewable energy and 
knowledge-based sectors. 
KCI acquired APAG Holding AG, Switzerland, in 2012. APAG is engaged in the development and sale of electronic 
and mechatronic modules and control devices for the automotive, consumer goods, power tool electronics and 
building automation industries. While APAG’s designing and engineering facility is located in Switzerland, its 
products are manufactured in the Czech Republic. 
“Kanoria Chemicals is an Indian family-run company. Thus, the high commitment of our workforce, closeness to 
our customers and management approach are similar to those found in Swiss SMEs. Many Indian companies are 
becoming global operators and are investing abroad. Switzerland is an interesting location because it provides 
innovation in high-tech areas and has a top qualified workforce. Another core aspect is the fact that Swiss 
business culture is very international. 
When we invested in APAG, we took Swiss free trade agreements for granted. APAG needs good market access 
as it is active in highly competitive markets. The FTAs of Switzerland and EFTA are helping to establish dynamic 
business models out of a small home market. Thus, the more FTAs Switzerland and EFTA conclude, especially 
with emerging markets, the more inbound foreign direct investment will come to Switzerland”,  says R.V. 
Kanoria, Chairman of Kanoria Chemicals.
BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES: Kanoria Chemicals, India/Switzerland
Investing in an EFTA Country
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Preferential Trade Agreements: 
A Multilateral Perspective 
Patrick Low1
Introduction
The relationship between preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs)2 and the multilateral trading system has sparked 
endless debate about how PTAs have affected the 
integrity and relevance of the World Trade Organization. 
For some, preferentialism is divisive, costly and largely 
unwelcome. This has become something of a minority 
view in recent years, although a wide body of literature 
acknowledges that whatever the benefits are of these 
kinds of agreements, they nevertheless carry costs 
avoided by a non-discriminatory regime. For others, 
PTAs are a reflection of the need for governments to 
maintain a context for trade cooperation in the face of 
the WTO’s failure for almost two decades to negotiate 
anything. If PTAs are really a self-help mechanism, the 
argument goes, one should not be too critical of their 
discriminatory fallout. 
PART IV: The Bigger Picture – 
Views from Academia
While both of these views can be defended, neither 
of them is particularly conducive to a search for 
pragmatic middle ground in a situation where both 
complementarity and conflict are possible. A nuanced 
view recognises that non-delivery on the part of the 
WTO has almost certainly contributed to the explosion 
of PTAs in the last two to three decades. At the same 
time, some PTAs are clearly designed to integrate their 
members more deeply and across a wider range of 
issues, going beyond what the WTO can realistically 
offer.
This article explores the origins of PTAs and their 
rationale, the costs of preferentialism, the reasons 
for stasis in the WTO’s negotiating functions, and a 
possible way forward for attaining greater coherence 
between the WTO and PTAs. 
The Origins and Rationale of PTAs 
The possibility of discriminatory trade arrangements 
was permitted from the GATT’s inception3 (Hudec, 
1991), in no small part to cover arrangements already 
in place. The first major preferential agreements were 
established in Europe – the Treaty of Rome establishing 
the European Community in 1957 and the creation of 
EFTA in 1960. By 1990 some 70 PTAs existed4. Today, 
more than 300 preferential agreements are in operation. 
Many more are being negotiated. Every WTO member 
belongs to, or is in the process of negotiating, one or 
more PTAs. Some countries belong to many, with the 
result that, on average, each WTO member is signatory 
to no fewer than 13 different preferential agreements. 
Approximately half of the PTAs in existence today 
are bilateral, while the rest incorporate three or more 
members.
1 Patrick Low is Vice President for Research at the Fung Global Institute in Hong Kong. Until mid-2013, he was Chief 
Economist at the WTO for 16 years. The views expressed here are those of the author. 
2 The designation of agreements among a subset of WTO members as preferential is preferable to the other commonly used 
designations – free trade area or regional trade agreement. This is because PTAs neither achieve free trade nor are all 
regional.
3 This article only discusses reciprocal preferences embodied in free trade areas and customs unions. It does not consider non-
reciprocal preferences.
4 The figures cited here and in the following paragraphs are taken from the WTO’s World Trade Report 2011. 
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PTAs have been designed with this objective in mind, at 
least not until the strategically-driven mega-regionals 
appeared. It would be fair to withhold judgment on 
these agreements, however, until we see what they 
look like. Finally, some PTAs have been motivated in 
part by the desire to impart a sense of credibility about 
a government’s policy intent, as well as continuity and 
greater stability through a tie-in effect. 
Taking all these considerations together, it is 
implausible to suggest that PTAs will go away in any 
foreseeable future. This does not mean that PTAs cause 
no harm or run no risk of fragmenting trade relations in 
ways that would be very difficult to reverse. Nor does 
it mean that nothing can be done to minimise the costs 
of discrimination through preferential trade. These 
issues are taken up in the rest of the article.  
The Costs of Preferentialism  
One analytical difficulty in reaching conclusions about 
the costs of discrimination in trade arises from the fact 
that we need to be clear about the point of comparison. 
If the basis for assessing the downside of discrimination 
is a perfect world in which no discrimination occurs, 
then the picture is clear. But the theory of the second 
best (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1955-56) tells us that if 
the first best is unattainable, we cannot readily make 
economic welfare comparisons between different, 
potentially second best, discriminatory scenarios. 
While this theoretical construct might seem arcane, it 
can be important when attempting to assess the impact 
of PTAs. It can mean that we are unable at first glance 
to conclude that less discrimination is better than more 
– it all depends on the circumstances.    
From another perspective, Jacob Viner showed that 
discriminatory trade policy could both create and 
divert trade (Viner, 1950). Trade creation occurs 
when one country inside a PTA captures market share 
in the domestic market of another country inside the 
grouping as a result of the preferential lowering of a 
tariff. Trade diversion occurs in a similar situation, 
except that a more efficient producer outside the PTA 
loses the market to a less competitive preferential 
supplier. Trade diversion is obviously a cost to the 
global economy, which may be set off or partially so 
by trade creation or through a growth effect arising 
from the trade opening that occurs within a PTA from 
Over the years, PTAs have become less about tariff 
preferences and more about the regulatory side of 
trade. It is somewhat surprising that in 2008 only 16% 
of trade between WTO members received preferential 
treatment in the face of positive most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) tariffs. Half of the balance was already MFN 
duty free and the rest were items to which PTAs 
partners did not extend discriminatory access. It is 
notable that two-thirds of goods attracting MFN tariffs 
in excess of 15% were not granted preferences under 
any PTA. Thus, while the non-tariff measure side of 
PTAs has become more important, it does not mean 
that tariffs are no longer an issue in relation to some 
trade flows.
Why have PTAs proliferated so much in recent years? 
It is tempting to attribute this to the failure of the 
GATT/WTO to deliver on negotiations. No doubt 
there is some truth to this, but it is far from the whole 
story. A major expansion in PTAs took place during 
the Uruguay Round, for example, even though this was 
considered a highly successful negotiation. An element 
in PTA formation is political, possibly embracing 
considerations that are not relevant in a multilateral 
setting. Forging neighbourly relations or solidifying 
political links are likely to be relevant in some cases. 
The recent drive to establish “mega-regionals” such 
as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) are clearly suffused with geopolitics. Some 
of the politics behind PTA formation, such as 
regional rivalries, could perhaps be partly addressed 
in a multilateral setting, but other elements need the 
specificity of a narrower setting. 
Among the other reasons why governments are 
attracted to PTAs is the fear of exclusion, or the 
domino effect. Some PTAs aspire to go further and 
faster than the WTO, reflecting frustration with 
ponderous multilateral processes. In other cases a 
PTA may seem appealing as an insurance policy 
against the risk of emerging protectionism, on the 
assumption that preferential partners would be the 
least and last affected. Alternatively, PTAs could serve 
as a protectionist mechanism, explicitly designed 
to draw some economies closer together while 
excluding others. While discrimination obviously has 
exclusionary effects, there is not much evidence that 
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More generally, in a world of highly integrated 
production structures, where the ubiquity of global 
value chains has resulted in some two-thirds of 
merchandise trade consisting of intermediate goods, it 
is not difficult to see how markets fractured by criss-
crossing and potentially incompatible trade regimes 
can frustrate trade and raise costs. The same can be 
said in respect of services, which are a considerably 
larger share of total trade than is generally appreciated, 
or easily measurable.
The WTO: Weakened Negotiating 
Capacity
The only successfully concluded negotiations under the 
auspices of the WTO have been on telecommunications 
and financial services, the Information Technology 
Agreement (ITA), and the re-negotiation of the 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). 
These are slim pickings in comparison to what has 
been on the table for 12 years in the Doha Round. 
At the time of writing, much rides on the outcome 
of the WTO Ministerial meeting in Bali, Indonesia, 
which outsiders can also benefit. The impact of trade 
diversion is ultimately an empirical matter depending 
on the situation prior to the establishment of a PTA as 
well as on its design. In short, we should not deny the 
real possibility of costs attached to discrimination.
In modern economies, it is not tariffs that are the 
greatest source of concern in terms of the discriminatory 
impact of PTAs. It is regulation and the risk of a 
continuing process of regulatory divergence. Trends 
are not easy to identify with precision, but it is not 
difficult to see how product standards diverge in ways 
that segment markets and affect competition. To the 
extent that PTAs reinforce regulatory differences, they 
augment the costs of doing business. The recognition 
of professional qualifications is a good example of 
where this occurs.
Another source of additional cost associated with 
PTAs is the rules of origin, which distort markets and 
sourcing choices when producers are obliged to trade 
off efficiency in production with access to markets. 
Rules of origin regimes also oblige businesses to incur 
deadweight administrative costs to ensure compliance. 
The 159-member World Trade Organization deals with the rules of trade at global level. © World Trade Organization
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Another argument is that historically the WTO has 
mis-specified its core mission, over-emphasising 
trade liberalisation at the expense of playing to its 
real strength, which is rule-making. History shows 
that apart from the reduction of industrial tariffs in 
industrial countries over several decades, the GATT/
WTO’s record on market opening has not been strong. 
No developing country has ever lowered an applied 
MFN tariff on the altar of a GATT/WTO negotiation 
other than in a GATT/WTO accession and in the ITA. 
Moreover, the record on market opening in labour-
intensive manufactures, services and agriculture is 
modest at best. One reason for patchy and modest 
progress on trade liberalisation is the juxtaposition 
of reciprocity and MFN as principles for negotiating 
market access. The combination of reciprocity and 
MFN makes it difficult for large and small countries to 
negotiate. Large countries will typically be reluctant to 
negotiate on the basis of relative reciprocity with small 
ones because they do not want other large countries 
to free ride on such deals via MFN. They want 
absolute reciprocity, not relative reciprocity, however 
measured. The Doha Round is more intensive in trade 
liberalisation than practically any other negotiation in 
the history of the institution. We should also remember 
that, unlike the WTO’s function of establishing 
global trade rules, there are other venues for trade 
liberalisation – namely the preferential and unilateral 
routes.  
The third aspect of the content of negotiations is about 
the legal character of agreements under the WTO. 
There is a tendency to assume that the WTO only 
deals with hard law which is justiciable through the 
dispute settlement system. Perhaps, however, there 
is room for softer versions of cooperation, ranging 
from information sharing to comity. The purpose of 
considering this approach is not to weaken the level 
of contractual commitment, but rather to facilitate 
and deepen it on the basis of a better understanding 
among potential parties to agreements. The Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism and the 2006 Transparency 
Mechanism5 for examining notified PTAs are examples 
of this approach.  
in December 2013, in terms of making progress in 
those negotiations. In thinking about how PTAs and 
the WTO might cohere more effectively, it is worth 
asking what is amiss with the WTO in relation to its 
negotiating function. 
Possible explanations fall into two broad categories. 
The first is political, and also applies in other realms 
of international cooperation such as climate change 
and the international financial architecture. The last 
few years have witnessed a sharp shift in the weight 
of economic power, largely towards China and the 
East, as well as other emerging economies. This has 
changed the leadership dynamics on the international 
scene and has made agreement more difficult. 
One way this manifests itself is in terms of the 
substantive discussions that have taken place over the 
years on the balance of rights and obligations among 
WTO members. The industrial countries tend to the 
view that the emerging economies are excessively 
reticent about raising their level of obligations. The 
emerging economies feel that despite their dynamic 
growth rates they still face considerable developmental 
challenges, in respect of which the industrial countries 
are less than fully understanding. These differences 
will have to be finessed for real progress to be made.
Secondly, there is the question of what is being 
negotiated. One aspect of this question is whether 
what the WTO is negotiating more than a decade on 
from the launch of the Doha Round really responds 
to the needs of the world economy. Some have said 
the agenda is markedly 20th century and the WTO 
is being left behind. The prominence and continued 
growth of international value chains is at the heart 
of this concern. The main point is that business 
cannot compartmentalise policy on goods, services, 
investment, procurement, standards and intellectual 
property in the way that the WTO does. This leads to 
incoherence, potential inconsistencies and makes the 
rules less responsive than they should be to the needs 
of the marketplace. This is an area where work is 
needed. Some lessons could be drawn from the way 
in which some PTAs have sought to respond to this 
reality. 
5 The full name of the mechanism is the Decision on a Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements (adopted on 
14 December 2006). 
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the participants believe must be part of the agreement 
before it can be multilateralised. 
Concluding Observations
Preferential trade agreements will not disappear any 
time soon. They do not offer the inclusiveness of 
the multilateral trading system and carry additional 
costs. But the perfect is not necessarily the friend of 
the possible. Rather than gainsay preferentialism, the 
challenge is to blunt its downside, rejuvenate and give 
meaning to the global vision of the WTO, and launch a 
process to multilateralise PTAs.
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The WTO and PTAs: Towards 
Greater Coherence
An obvious mechanism for bringing PTAs and the 
WTO closer together would be for the WTO to make 
more progress multilaterally. But there is also another 
possibility – the multilateralisation of regionalism6. 
In the case of tariffs, this might mean that each PTA 
would work towards narrowing the gap between MFN 
and preferential rates on a non-discriminatory basis. 
The WTO’s role here would be a gradual process of 
consolidation and rationalisation. On the regulatory 
side, the process could begin by concentrating on the 
least contentious elements in PTAs and simply making 
them part of the WTO. Provisions would be crafted 
on the basis of whichever PTA was deemed to strike 
the most appropriate balance around which agreement 
could be achieved, or else new provisions could be 
fashioned from an amalgam of different approaches. 
The relevant provisions in the PTAs concerned would 
then be aligned to the new multilateral formulation. A 
prior stage to actually crafting new WTO provisions 
might be to develop best practices as a way of 
building confidence in the process. An obvious place 
to launch work in this direction would be through the 
Transparency Mechanism.  
One key feature that would influence the success of 
a programme of multilateralisation relates to decision 
making. On the assumption that some of the leading 
PTAs, including between developed and developing 
countries, may aim for provisions exceeding the 
quality found in the WTO, it is reasonable to assume 
that some of these would go further than a number 
of smaller and weaker economies would consider 
manageable, or in their best interest. For this reason, 
a viable multilateralisation process would need to be 
based on a critical mass decision-making approach of 
the kind used in the telecommunications and financial 
services negotiations and in the ITA. The essence of 
this approach is that it customises the balance of rights 
and obligations among the membership around each 
issue, without embedding any discrimination against 
those who do not assume the obligations in question. A 
critical mass defines itself in terms of which members 
6 See Low (2012) for an elaboration of how this might work.
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From fry to harvest size – Vaki’s equipment allows for the accurate monitoring of all species.
BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES: Vaki, Iceland 
The Fish Scanner
Iceland-based Vaki is a leader in the development 
and manufacture of aquaculture and river fish stock 
management equipment. The company’s infrared 
scanning technology and cameras provide for a high 
level of automation in the monitoring of fish migration 
in rivers and lakes, resulting in improved efficiency 
in aquaculture and wild fish research. Vaki employs 
40 people in three countries and exports to more than 
50 markets, a number of which are EFTA free trade 
partners. 
“The free trade agreement between EFTA and Chile 
strengthened our market position in Chile, which is 
our main export market. It abolished a 6% customs 
tariff on our products which, in such a highly 
competitive environment, is a significant reduction. 
The FTA with Canada is also important for us since it 
puts Vaki in a privileged position compared to some 
of our competitors”, says Hermann Kristjánsson, 
Managing Director of Vaki. 
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Trade between the EFTA countries, e.g. Norway and 
Switzerland, never developed to a level expected in 
a free trade zone. Rather, based upon the experience 
of failed efforts by single countries to bring about a 
bilateral association with the EEC in the early 1960s, 
EFTA developed in building a joint platform for 
multilateral negotiations with the six EEC members; 
joining forces led the EEC to the negotiating table. 
When Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom 
joined the EEC in 1972, this joint effort was most 
crucial for the conclusion of the 1972 landmark FTAs 
between individual EFTA States and the EEC on 
industrial goods and processed agricultural products. 
They gradually provided full market access in industrial 
goods to and from the EEC. While in the meantime 
most EFTA members left for the European Union or 
signed the EEA Agreement, the 1972 FTA continues 
to provide the main pillar in Swiss-EU relations after 
more than 40 years of existence. The format used 
then for trade negotiations – preparing jointly and 
concluding separately – has been a successful mantra 
of EFTA ever since.
The 1972 EFTA very much shaped long-term attitudes 
of the Association in subsequent negotiations. Strongly 
relying upon the disciplines of the GATT, EFTA 
focused on industrial goods and processed agricultural 
products, leaving basic agricultural products largely 
aside. Switzerland and Norway continue to be among 
the most protectionist agricultural producers even 
within EFTA trade. Likewise, EFTA did not strongly 
venture into trade in services prior to the 1995 GATS, 
despite the EFTA Convention having laid foundations 
to this effect. On the other hand, EFTA made major 
contributions to addressing non-tariff barriers. The 
1988 Tampere Convention was a milestone in technical 
barriers to trade. It strongly influenced subsequent 
developments within the EEC and the GATT, 
providing the foundations for the code and subsequent 
WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. The 
obligation to notify a draft regulation and allow for 
international comments has remained a unique feature 
originally developed by the EFTA countries. 
EFTA Free Trade Agreements: 
Past, Present and Future 
Professor Thomas Cottier1
A Common Platform for 
Negotiations 
In these high days of preferential trade agreements, 
it is worth recalling that EFTA laid the foundations 
of modern post-World War II free trade agreements, 
offering an alternative to deeper regional integration 
within the customs union of the European Economic 
Community. Founded in 1960, EFTA provided a 
framework for European countries neither able 
nor willing to join the EEC. Within the two options 
provided for by Article XXIV of the GATT 1947 – 
customs unions and free trade areas – EFTA responded 
to the latter and thus to the path of international 
cooperation as opposed to deeper integration and 
supranational structures. EFTA reflected the traditional 
precepts of sovereignty, maintaining full jurisdiction 
over foreign external relations and leaving domestic 
institutions without the supervision of international 
bodies. The EFTA Secretariat, until the signing of 
the EEA Agreement with the Member States of the 
European Union, would not engage in supervisory 
functions comparable to those performed by the 
Commission of the EEC. 
From the outset, the main purpose of EFTA was not so 
much to foster trade between its members, although 
this was for a time of considerable importance, e.g. 
between Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
1 Professor of European and International Economic Law, Managing Director, World Trade Institute, University of Bern, 
Switzerland. I am indebted to Gabriela Wermelinger, MLaw, and Charlotte Sieber, MLaw, World Trade Institute, for their 
most valuable assistance. The views expressed here are those of the author.
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The Shift to Third-Country 
Relations
While relations with the European Union henceforth 
were defined by the EEA Agreement and a separate 
Swiss agenda, third-country relations emerged as a new 
common theme for the four remaining EFTA countries. 
Since 1990, EFTA’s members have jointly concluded 
26 FTAs2. These agreements were negotiated as a 
group in the traditions of the 1972 FTAs and a common 
template. In some cases, countries preferred to go on 
their own, depending on prevailing and potentially 
conflicting interests. Thus, FTAs with Japan, China 
and the Faroe Islands were concluded separately by 
Switzerland. Likewise Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway concluded separate agreements with the Faroe 
Islands, and Iceland concluded a separate agreement 
with China. 
EFTA thus was reduced to a marriage of convenience 
and each partner reserved the right to go it alone. 
Nevertheless, all of these agreements show common 
traits in terms of structure and content. As before, 
they rely strongly upon WTO disciplines and 
exclude agriculture to the extent possible. They 
venture cautiously into services, yet without major 
breakthroughs compared to the level of liberalisation 
in GATS. They entail elements of “TRIPS plus” 
(Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights), in particular on the part of 
Switzerland, and expand into protection of investment 
in line with current trends. 
Overall, the template of EFTA agreements remains 
classic. They are not uniform, and are tailored to each 
member. Yet we search in vain for new and pioneering 
approaches to current and impending challenges. For 
example, recent EFTA free trade agreements contain 
a chapter on trade and sustainable development, 
yet without offering innovative rules on key issues 
such as Process and Production Methods (PPMs) of 
transfer of technology in the operative part on trade 
in goods. Liberalisation in services remains cautious 
and intellectual property protection largely follows 
“WTO plus” rules. The template and model of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement has been more 
EFTA-EEC relations were initially founded on the 
1972 FTAs, but subsequent developments were no 
longer made in tandem. While Switzerland constantly 
upgraded its bilateral relations, resulting in more 
than 130 additional bilateral instruments, other EFTA 
members were less prepared when the European 
Union adopted the Single European Act and returned 
to majority voting in 1986 in matters relating to the 
Common Market. The Internal Market programme 
created fears among the majority of EFTA countries 
of facing market access restrictions. It led to the 1992 
Agreement on the European Economic Area. 
Splitting EFTA and Diverging 
Avenues to European Integration
The EEA Agreement completely reshaped relations 
between the EFTA States and the emerging European 
Union. Austria, Finland and Sweden eventually joined 
the European Union in 1995. Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and Norway stayed in the EEA, and Switzerland 
opted to stay outside of the EEA and to continue on its 
well-established path of sectoral bilateral agreements. 
The principal common raison d’être of EFTA – 
defining common relations with the European Union 
– ceased to exist, and split EFTA into two different 
camps. Institutionally, the EFTA Secretariat was 
split into a Brussels office dealing with the EEA and 
a Geneva office dealing with external relations. The 
EEA Agreement brought about a solid institutional 
framework in dealings with the European Union, 
characterised by the EFTA Surveillance Authority 
(ESA) and the EFTA Court, including preliminary 
rules. It also brought about parallel control, by the 
European Commission and the European Court of 
Justice, of EEA Treaty obligations on the part of the 
EU Member States. Swiss-EU relations, on the other 
hand, remained without any common institutional 
framework beyond mixed committees. The divide 
could not be more prominent. EFTA ceased to exist 
as a common platform for dealings with the European 
Union. Moreover, it was reduced to four members. It 
had clearly lost the battle for a large free trade zone 
within Europe against a predominant customs union 
and deeper integration. 
2 See http://www.efta.int/free-trade/free-trade-agreements for a list of concluded agreements.
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is much too early to discuss potential outcomes. The 
challenges are formidable, and the prospects of finding 
common ground in terms of non-tariff barriers and 
regulations, mainly addressing behind-the-border 
issues, remain questionable. Yet, to the extent that 
the European Union and the United States, in light 
of changed geopolitical constellations, are willing 
and able to agree even in selected areas and sectors 
such as the chemical, pharmaceutical or automotive 
industries, new global standards will emerge. The 
EFTA countries will be able to adjust to those 
unilaterally. To the extent, however, that they depend 
upon mutual recognition, the EFTA countries will face 
formidable discrimination. Efforts to latch onto TTIP 
agreements may be successful, yet may also fail in 
light of the fact that most countries around the world 
seek equal treatment. It is more likely therefore that 
those results will eventually be multilateralised within 
the WTO. This will take time, however, and may force 
industries to relocate to the European Union in the 
meantime in order to avoid trade distortions. Likewise, 
the implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership which 
is currently being negotiated between 12 American 
and Asian countries, including the United States and 
Japan, are likely to produce market access restrictions 
and discrimination even where EFTA free trade 
agreements exist with TPP members. It is unlikely that 
the TPP will extend accumulation of origin and mutual 
recognition to external free trade partners and thus 
allow market access to the TPP by way of an EFTA 
free trade agreement with one of its members. 
Overall, the potential for EFTA free trade agreements 
to secure long-term market access in light of the 
impending TTIP and TPP is limited. Comparable to 
the EEA Agreement in 1992, a successful TTIP will 
forcefully push the remaining EFTA members to 
consider EU membership – this time in light of third-
country relations and the geopolitical changes that 
affect current and future developments. The mere 
extension of the EEA to a customs union will hardly 
suffice, as the main focus will be on non-tariff barriers, 
services, intellectual property rights, investment, and 
trade-and-development issues.
influential in shaping new approaches, for example 
to labour relations, environment and investment 
protection. The world no longer looks to EFTA 
agreements for guidance. Their main function, it would 
seem, is to prevent or remedy potential discrimination 
on third markets in relation to the European Union. 
The EFTA agenda is synchronised with the EU’s 
external relations agenda with emerging economies. 
Partly, EFTA succeeds in passing the line ahead of the 
European Union. Partly, it follows suit. 
EFTA and EU agreements, however, differ 
considerably. While EFTA agreements focus on 
classical areas of market access, EU agreements are 
more elaborate and comprehensive. EU templates 
are closer to association and overall development 
agreements, with an important component on trade and 
investment. This is particularly true for agreements 
concluded under the economic partnership agreement 
(EPA) framework. Moreover, the geographical scope 
varies considerably. The European Union currently has 
20 association agreements in place3, many of which are 
in regions where the EFTA countries are completely 
absent. This is particularly true in respect of Africa, 
except for North and South Africa. Pressing problems 
on immigration, which equally affect the EFTA 
countries, remain without a proper response in terms 
of economic and commercial cooperation. In the long 
run, EU association agreements offer deeper relations 
and are likely to marginalise the current generation 
of EFTA agreements to the extent that they exist. The 
same is true in relation to trade agreements concluded 
by the United States, using NAFTA templates. These 
agreements are more comprehensive. They offer a 
broader scope of cooperation than can be observed 
in EFTA agreements. They do not engage in burden 
sharing in terms of development and focus on an 
agenda of trade promotion.
The Prospects of TTIP and TPP
Ongoing negotiations between the United States and 
the European Union, encompassing 50 States in North 
America and the 28 EU Member States, and thus 
some 50% of world trade and 30% of world GDP, risk 
creating a major and perhaps final blow to EFTA. It 
3 For the complete list of association agreements, see http://eeas.europa.eu/association/docs/agreements_en.pdf.
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by way of introducing international surveillance and 
judicial review can best be served by recourse to the 
EFTA institutions – ESA, the EFTA Court and the joint 
Council – developed for the EEA. These mechanisms 
can equally be used for existing and future sectoral 
agreements. Switzerland’s path of integration may also 
be extended to other countries outside the European 
Union which, for their own reasons, may be interested 
in joining EFTA on comparable terms. These may 
include the “micro-states” and perhaps others, such 
as Ukraine. In some cases, countries may be seeking 
a close relationship with the European Union, but 
may fall short of being accepted for membership or 
may themselves be reluctant to accept supranational 
structures of deeper integration.
The European Union should stand ready to engage 
in shaping what may be called the fourth circle of 
European integration, in addition to the layers of 
the Monetary Union, the Internal Market and the 
EEA. It should be interested in developing coherent 
and common forms of cooperation with common 
institutions of surveillance and judicial review as 
countries wait to enter the EU or decide to remain 
outside. The European Union should also be interested 
in an organisation engaged in burden sharing. 
European dialogue: EU and EEA EFTA parliamentarians at a meeting of the EEA Joint Parliamentary Committee in the European Parliament.  
© European Union 2013 EP
The Future of EFTA 
The EFTA “split” and the challenges in third-country 
relations in light of the TTIP and TPP projects call for a 
rethink of the future role of the organisation in Europe 
and worldwide. For the time being, Europe will 
evolve at four speeds. Two are within the European 
Union, entailing the Monetary Union and the Internal 
Market. A third one is the EEA Agreement. There is 
a need to provide for a fourth circle of countries that 
are unwilling or unable to join the European Union 
or the European Economic Area. There is also a need 
to provide a proper and coherent framework for the 
European “micro-states”, in particular Andorra, 
Monaco, San Marino and perhaps the Vatican. EFTA 
is a suitable platform to this effect and perfectly able 
to shape the relations of its Member States with the 
European Union through a common and shared 
institutional framework. 
If the institutional architecture of the EEA Agreement 
were to be extended to non-EEA countries, then EFTA 
would be particularly well placed to accommodate 
even the complex Swiss-EU relations. Arguably, the 
European Union’s legitimate objective of overcoming 
current institutional deficiencies in Swiss-EU relations 
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Increasing the number of EFTA members would 
reinvigorate the tradition of a common platform of 
negotiations with the European Union and other 
countries. Negotiations between the EU and EFTA 
members would entail the support and involvement 
of the EFTA Secretariat. The increase in membership 
would reinforce the standing of EFTA vis-à-vis the 
European Union, within the WTO and with other 
international organisations. An extended membership 
would also increase the potential for concluding 
substantial FTAs with third countries and for finding 
solutions in latching on appropriately to future systems 
of preferential trade, encompassing major markets. 
Structuring the fourth circle of European integration 
calls for common institutions within EFTA, but does 
not require uniform agreements. Divergent needs and 
levels of social and economic development can be 
taken into account under a common roof. The structure 
allows for tailor-made solutions, and the bilateral 
avenue pursued by Switzerland is an example in point. 
The main focus of EFTA will again be on European 
integration and its relations with the European Union. 
Third-country relations, given the nature of the free 
trade zone, may continue to be pursued jointly or in 
isolation. Joint efforts, where possible, will increase 
leverage. Isolated agreements between single EFTA 
States with third countries may be easier to achieve 
depending on the interests at stake. Yet only an EFTA 
speaking with one voice will render it a respected 
partner and a lasting alternative to fully fledged 
integration within the European Union for those states 
that prefer to stay away or are unable to join.
EFTA could thus develop into an institutional host 
for existing and future EU association with states 
wishing to maintain the traditional perceptions of 
national sovereignty within Europe. EFTA could 
expand its function of surveillance and adjudication 
in the spirit of international cooperation on the basis 
of agreements that may vary from country to country. 
Unlike the EEA, relations would not be uniform but 
rely upon tailor-made agreements. EFTA could engage 
in technical assistance and knowledge transfer within 
the community of these countries. It could develop a 
voice to speak for the countries in the third and fourth 
circles of integration vis-à-vis the European Union and 
the world. This would enhance its chances of latching 
onto the TTIP on the side of the European Union, and 
would increase the voice of EFTA in international 
organisations, in particular the WTO. 
An expanded membership would change the nature 
of EFTA. Differences in social and economic 
development, as well as governmental structures, 
would require a rethink of the scope and level of 
commitments and would imply a departure from 
traditional approaches. The integration of new 
members would need to entail progress in agriculture, 
as many countries depend upon agricultural exports 
for stability and prosperity. It would require the 
enhancement of components of focused assistance, 
technical cooperation and migration policies, so far 
largely absent from EFTA. EFTA, in other words, 
would move closer to the templates and types of 
agreements concluded by the European Union with 
developing and emerging economies. It would engage 
in European burden sharing. 
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ANNEXES
Annex I: EFTA’S Third-Country Partners
Partners Signing of 
Joint Declaration
Signing of Free 
Trade Agreement
Entry into Force Termination
Albania 10 December 1992 17 December 2009 1 November 2010 for 
Liechtenstein and Switzerland 
1 August 2011 for Norway 
1 October 2011 for Iceland 
Algeria 12 December 2002
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
24 June 2013
Bulgaria 10 December 1991 29 March 1993 1 January 1994 1 January 2007
Canada 26 January 2008 1 July 2009
Central American States 20 July 2010  
(with Panama)
24 June 2013 with 
Costa Rica and 
Panama
Chile 26 June 2003 1 December 2004
Colombia 17 May 2006 25 November 2008 1 July 2011 for Liechtenstein 
and Switzerland
Croatia 19 June 2000 21 June 2001 1 April 2002 24 November 2013
Czech Republic 13 June 19901 20 March 19921 1 July 19921 1 May 2004
Egypt 8 December 1995 27 January 2007 1 August 2007
Estonia 10 December 1991 7 December 1995 1 October 1997 1 May 2004
Georgia 28 June 2012
Gulf Cooperation 
Council2
23 May 2000 22 June 2009
Hong Kong China 21 June 2011 1 October 2012 for 
Liechtenstein, Switzerland and 
Iceland 
1 November 2012 for Norway
Hungary 13 June 1990 29 March 1993 1 October 1993 1 May 2004
Israel 17 September 1992 1 January 1993
Jordan 19 June 1997 21 June 2001 1 September 2002
Republic of Korea 15 December 2005 1 September 2006
Latvia 10 December 1991 7 December 1995 1 June 1996 1 May 2004
Lebanon 19 June 1997 24 June 2004 1 January 2007
Lithuania 10 December 1991 7 December 1995 1 January 1997 1 May 2004
Macedonia 29 March 1996 19 June 2000 1 May 2002
Malaysia 20 July 2010
Mauritius 9 June 2009
MERCOSUR 12 December 20003
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Partners Signing of 
Joint Declaration
Signing of Free 
Trade Agreement
Entry into Force Termination
Mexico 27 November 2000 1 July 2001
Mongolia 28 June 2007
Montenegro 12 December 20004 14 November 2011 1 September 2012 for 
Liechtenstein and Switzerland 
1 October 2012 for Iceland 
1 November 2012 for Norway
Morocco 8 December 1995 19 June 1997 1 December 1999
Myanmar 24 June 2013
Pakistan 12 November 2012
Palestinian Authority 16 December 1996 30 November 1998 1 July 1999
Peru 24 April 2006 24 June (Reykjavik) 
/ 14 July 2010 
(Lima)
1 July 2011 for Liechtenstein 
and Switzerland 
1 October 2011 for Iceland 
1 July 2012 for Norway 
Poland 13 June 1990 10 December 1992 1 September 1994 1 May 2004
Romania 10 December 1991 10 December 1992 1 July 1993 1 January 2007
Serbia 12 December 20004 17 December 2009 1 October 2010 for 
Liechtenstein and Switzerland 
1 June 2011 for Norway 
1 October 2011 for Iceland
Singapore 26 June 2002 1 January 2003
Slovak Republic 3 June 19901 20 March 19921 1 July 19921 1 May 2004
Slovenia 20 May 1992 13 June 1995 1 September 1998 1 May 2004
Southern African 
Customs Union5 
26 June 2006 1 May 2008
Spain 26 June 1979 1 May 1980 1 January 1986
Tunisia 8 December 1995 17 December 2004 1 June 2005
Turkey 10 December 1991 1 April 1992
Ukraine 19 June 2000 24 June 2010 1 June 2012
1 With Czechoslovakia.
2 Comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.
3  With Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
4  With the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
5  Comprising Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.
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Annex II: EFTA’S Free Trade Partners (2013)
Rank Country Total Trade 
(million USD)
Share 
(%)
Exports 
(million USD)
Share 
(%)
Rank Imports 
(million USD)
Share 
(%)
Rank
World  681 769 100.00  392 112 100.00 n.a.  289 657 100.00 n.a.
EU28  465 902   68.34  260 064 66.32 n.a.  205 838 71.06 n.a.
EFTA third-country 
partners (35) excl. EU28  63 480  9.31  44 959 11.47 n.a.  18 522 6.39 n.a.
Intra-EFTA  5 597  0.82  2 973 0.76 n.a.  2 623 0.91 n.a.
Bilateral FTA partners (China, 
Japan, Faroe Islands)1 46 244  6.8  20 219 4.1 n.a.  26 025 8.98 n.a.
                 
1 Germany (EU)  134 374   19.71  64 545 16.46 1  69 829 24.11 1
2 United Kingdom (EU)  68 120   9.99  55 347 14.12 2  12 774 4.41 6
3 France (EU)  45 324   6.65  25 712 6.56 4  19 612 6.77 3
4 Italy (EU)  42 457   6.23  19 784 5.05 5  22 672 7.83 2
5 Netherlands (EU)  37 189   5.45  26 757 6.82 3  10 433 3.60 7
6 China1  30 163 4.42  10 804 2.76 7  19 359 6.68 4
7 Sweden (EU)  25 401   3.73  11 937 3.04 6  13 464 4.65 5
8 Belgium (EU)  17 141   2.51  9 916 2.53 8  7 225 2.49 10
9 Austria (EU)  16 632   2.44  7 620 1.94 13  9 013 3.11 8
10 Spain (EU)  15 674   2.30  8 590 2.19 11  7 083 2.45 11
11 Japan1  15 648 2.30  9 034 2.30 10  6 614 2.28 12
12 Denmark (EU)  14 398   2.11  7 831 2.00 12  6 567 2.27 13
13 Hong Kong China  11 204   1.64  9 121 2.33 9  2 083 0.72 18
14 Ireland (EU)  10 348   1.52  2 415 0.62 22  7 933 2.74 9
15 Korea, Republic of  9 082   1.33  7 051 1.80 14  2 032 0.70 19
16 Poland (EU)  8 933   1.31  4 530 1.16 16  4 403 1.52 14
17 Canada  7 486   1.10  4 248 1.08 17  3 238 1.12 16
18 Singapore  6 674   0.98  5 147 1.31 15  1 527 0.53 22
19 Finland (EU)  6 485   0.95  3 291 0.84 19  3 194 1.10 17
20 Czech Republic (EU)  6 451   0.95  3 142 0.80 20  3 309 1.14 15
21 Turkey  4 882   0.72  2 875 0.73 21  2 008 0.69 20
22 United Arab Emirates2  4 316   0.63  3 705 0.94 18  611 0.21 33
23 Mexico  2 753   0.40  1 590 0.41 24  1 162 0.40 26
24 Portugal (EU)  2 572   0.38  1 454 0.37 25  1 118 0.39 27
25 Hungary (EU)  2 498   0.37  1 168 0.30 29  1 330 0.46 24
26 South Africa  2 446   0.36 918 0.23 31  1 529 0.53 21
27 Norway  2 443   0.36  1 376 0.35 27  1 067 0.37 28
28 Saudi Arabia2  2 355   0.35  2 220 0.57 23 135 0.05 51
29 Switzerland  2 119   0.31  851 0.22 33  1 268 0.44 25
30 Romania (EU)  2 030   0.30  1 078 0.27 30  952 0.33 29
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Rank Country Total Trade 
(million USD)
Share 
(%)
Exports 
(million USD)
Share 
(%)
Rank Imports 
(million USD)
Share 
(%)
Rank
31 Slovakia (EU)  1 872   0.27  511 0.13 40  1 361 0.47 23
32 Israel  1 844   0.27  1 173 0.30 28  671 0.23 32
33 Greece (EU)  1 634   0.24  1 405 0.36 26  228 0.08 47
34 Lithuania (EU)  1 377   0.20  594 0.15 37  783 0.27 30
35 Ukraine  1 168   0.17  862 0.22 32  306 0.11 42
36 Estonia (EU)  1 151   0.17  463 0.12 42  688 0.24 31
37 Iceland  1 024   0.15  746 0.19 35  278 0.10 44
38 Qatar2 944   0.14  680 0.17 36  264 0.09 45
39 Egypt  904   0.13  811 0.21 34  94 0.03 53
40 Slovenia (EU)  883   0.13  422 0.11 44  461 0.16 36
41 Lebanon  875   0.13  557 0.14 38  318 0.11 39
42 Latvia (EU)  854   0.13  296 0.08 50  557 0.19 34
43 Colombia3  781   0.11  461 0.12 43  319 0.11 38
44 Chile  776   0.11  541 0.14 39  236 0.08 46
45 Morocco  720   0.11  403 0.10 45  316 0.11 40
46 Luxembourg (EU)  690   0.10  362 0.09 47  328 0.11 37
47 Peru  673   0.10  188 0.05 57  486 0.17 35
48 Bulgaria (EU)  621   0.09  339 0.09 49  282 0.10 43
49 Kuwait2  489   0.07  474 0.12 41  16 0.01 62
50 Tunisia  439   0.06  241 0.06 55  198 0.07 48
51 Croatia (EU)  434   0.06  257 0.07 54  178 0.06 49
52 Faroe Islands1  433 0.06  381 0.10 46  52 0.02 58
53 Panama  426   0.06  356 0.09 48  70 0.02 56
54 Botswana  348   0.05  33 0.01 64  315 0.11 41
55 Bahrain2  340   0.05  272 0.07 52  68 0.02 57
56 Oman2  292   0.04  283 0.07 51  9 0.00 65
57 Jordan  276   0.04  269 0.07 53  8 0.00 66
58 Serbia  268   0.04  162 0.04 58  106 0.04 52
59 Costa Rica  263   0.04  92 0.02 60  171 0.06 50
60 Cyprus (EU)  225   0.03  199 0.05 56  26 0.01 61
61 Macedonia  148   0.02  61 0.02 61  87 0.03 54
62 Bosnia and Herzegovina  138   0.02  60 0.02 62  78 0.03 55
63 Malta (EU)  134   0.02  100 0.03 59  34 0.01 60
64 Namibia  70   0.01  30 0.01 65  40 0.01 59
65 Albania  48   0.01  34 0.01 63  14 0.00 63
66 Palestine  30   0.00  29 0.01 66  1 0.00 69
67 Montenegro  13   0.00  11 0.00 67  2 0.00 68
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Rank Country Total Trade 
(million USD)
Share 
(%)
Exports 
(million USD)
Share 
(%)
Rank Imports 
(million USD)
Share 
(%)
Rank
68 Liechtenstein  11   0.00  1 0.00 70  10 0.00 64
69 Swaziland  9   0.00  3 0.00 68  6 0.00 67
70 Lesotho  1   0.00  1 0.00 69  0 0.00 70
Source: Global Trade Atlas.  Data is for 2012.
1 Iceland and Switzerland signed bilateral free trade agreements with China in 2013. Switzerland has a bilateral free trade agreement with Japan, 
which entered into force in 2009. All EFTA States have bilateral free trade agreements with the Faroe Islands, which have been in force since the 
early 1990s.
2  FTA with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) signed in June 2009. The agreement is expected to enter into force in early 2014.
3  FTA with Colombia signed in 2008, but yet to be ratified by all parties.
n.a. = not applicable
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GLOSSARY
BIT Bilateral Investment Treaty
EC European Communities
EEA European Economic Area
EEC European Economic Community
EFTA European Free Trade Association
EPA Economic Partnership Agreement
ESA EFTA Surveillance Authority
EU European Union
FTA Free Trade Agreement
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services (WTO)
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (WTO)
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council; comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GPA Agreement on Government Procurement (WTO)
ILO International Labour Organization
ITA Information Technology Agreement (WTO)
JDC Joint Declaration on Cooperation
MERCOSUR Southern Common Market
MFN Most-Favoured-Nation
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
PPM Process and Production Method
PTA Preferential Trade Agreement
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
SACU Southern African Customs Union; comprising Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and 
Swaziland
SMEs Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
SPS Sanitary and Phytosanitary
TBT Technical Barriers to Trade
TISA Trade in Services Agreement
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
TRIPS Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (WTO)
TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UN United Nations
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
US United States
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
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The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is an intergovernmental organisation set up for the promotion of free trade 
and economic integration to the benefit of its four Member States: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 
The Association is responsible for the management of:
• The EFTA Convention, which forms the legal basis of the organisation and governs free trade relations between the 
EFTA States;
• EFTA’s worldwide network of free trade; and
• The Agreement on the European Economic Area, which enables three of the four EFTA States (Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and Norway) to participate fully in the Internal Market of the European Union.
EFTA Secretariat, Geneva (Headquarters)
9-11, rue de Varembé  Tel. +41 22 33 22 600  
1211 Geneva 20  Fax: +41 22 33 22 677 
Switzerland Email: mail.gva@efta.int 
 www.efta.int
EFTA Secretariat, Brussels
Rue Joseph II, 12-16  Tel. +32 2 286 17 11 
1000 Brussels  Fax: +32 2 286 17 50 
Belgium Email: mail@efta.int 
 www.efta.int
EFTA Statistical Office, Luxembourg
Bâtiment Bech Tel. +352 4301 37775 
Office F2/908 Fax: +352 4301 32145 
5 Rue Alphonse Weicker Email: efta-lux@ec.europa.eu 
2721 Luxembourg  www.efta.int
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